Originally Posted by CONF iture
When the PF was full back stick for a thirty seconds period after the aircraft was stalled, neither of the 2 other guys would know that important piece of information. That's what Sullenberger is talking about.
I wonder, did Cpt. Sullenberger really think this through?
Originally Posted by narrator
Would AF447 have had the same disaster if this cockpit were a Boeing instead of an Airbus?
Originally Posted by Sullenberger
I think it would have been much less likely to happen on a Boeing, because the control wheels are large, they're obvious, and could hardly have been missed.
The airplane stalled at 02:10:58. Until 02:11:31 the PF's stick is moving so rapidly back and forth that it is hardly possible to interpret what it is doing to the airplane, except by looking at the attitude display. At 02:11:38 the PNF briefly takes the controls. The attitude is then 15 degrees NU, IAS 133 kt, STALL STALL STALL. Does he push the sidestick forward?
The PF's sidestick reached the aft stop at 02:11:41, that is 43 seconds after the airplane stalled. The AoA was then increasing through 35 degrees. The captain returned at 02:11:42.5. The AoA exceeded 41.5 degrees, became NCD and the stall warning stopped at 02:11:45.
If, at that point, the 2 other guys had known "that important piece of information", what would have been their reaction to it?
Would they have been that "extremely purposeful crew with a good comprehension of the situation (that) could have carried out a manoeuvre that would have made it possible to perhaps recover control of the aeroplane."?