The first of the documents tabled on Monday by Mr Quinn is titled:
Regulatory Policy – CEO-PN001-2004
CASA’s Industry Sector Priorities and Classification of Civil Aviation Activities
I had a double-take, but there it is in black and white:
1.5 This policy is a departure from the classification of operations scheme currently specified in subregulations 2(6) and 2(7) and regulation 206 of the Civil Aviation Regulations 1988, and lays the foundation for the regulatory reclassification of civil air operations that will be specified in Part 119 of the Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998.
It’s difficult to know which of the implications I find more disturbing:
1. That CASA appears not to comprehend that subregulations 2(6) and 2(7) and regulation 206 of the
Civil Aviation Regulations 1988 say nothing about how CASA may or may not allocate its resources to deal with the risks arising from the various operations in the various classifications. There might be less confusion inside CASA, but for 3 below.
2. That CASA appears unabashedly to believe that it is appropriate for a regulatory authority to depart from what it (albeit mistakenly) understands the law to require, by promulgating a ‘policy’ to that effect.
3. That CASA continues to be able to develop and revise pages and pages of policy, year after year, about what CASA would like the law about classification of operations to say and do, and continues to manage to push new regulations through the legislative process, but, in the
16 years since Commissioner Staunton recommended that
urgent consideration be given to amending or replacing regulation 206 to overcome the problems identified by the Commissioner,
CASA has been unable to push through anything – not a single change to a single syllable in the regulations – to overcome those problems. That’s despite a recommendation which cost nine lives and a $20million inquiry.
However, by far the most disturbing implication of the evidence given by the CASA witnesses at the Pel Air hearings is confirmation of something I have been fearing for some time. It appears to me that:
4. Nobody inside CASA takes responsibility for the progress and resolution of issues that arose before they arrived in the job. It’s a neat trick: Fred was in position X and responsible for issue Q in 2003. Fred swaps positions with Bob in 2007, and Bob disclaims responsibility for issue Q in 2012 because it arose in 2003 when Bob wasn’t in the job. Fred disclaims responsibility because he’s not in that job: Bob is. George turns up as CEO in 2009 and disclaims responsibility for anything that was unresolved when he arrived. Meanwhile, Fred, Bob, Ted and Alice have all occupied various positions on the executive merry-go-round for over a decade, with the occasional temporary dismount, and all are perfectly well aware of all the issues that should have been resolved by the organisation in the previous decade or so.
5. Nobody outside CASA takes responsibility for changing 4. That’s the
real killer.
We could have an earth shattering result from all of this shovelling, but my guess is that it will peter out to nothing and we will all be left wondering how the hell the ATSB came up with that report.
Sadly, that’s my guess too, LB.