MAA MILITARY AIR SAFETY CONFERENCE

[tucumseh]

Mr Bollo

Thank you.


First, I have always said the implementation was variable. I have mentioned a paper submitted to DPA’s 3 Star DCE in January 2000, which specifically praises certain parts of DLO, but notes their competence and adherence is largely down to the background of the staffs they had. That is, they were taught properly.



I stand by my statements regarding my own experiences, in MoD(PE), AMSO (when we were forced to move there) and DPA. When I was handed my first letter of delegation in MoD(PE) in the 80s I was given one piece of advice. Always retain a copy of anything you put your name to when exercising your delegation. Apart from anything else, you are required to be able to justify decisions for all time. Many years after leaving a particular job, I have been asked to give evidence to BoIs, Coroners, MPs and others. My files are voluminous and have come in very handy! Later, in 1990, I was given a second piece of advice – If someone lies to you, record all subsequent conversations. That was after a meeting in Harrogate at which AMSO supply staffs passed on their bosses’ directions – I was not to maintain airworthiness on my programmes. That specific example was smoke in RN Lynx cockpits. AMSO’s view was – let the RN ground their fleet and come a-begging next year for funding. Not sure the aircrew in sickbay agreed. I didn’t.



To further support what you say, the Director Internal Audit report of June 1996 only praised one section across the entirety of MoD(PE) and AMSO/AML – Aero Engines. That reprot was submitted directly to PUS, the Chief Accounting Officer. It was initiated in January 1993 (I know, 3.5 years, but that’s MoD for you) with the sole aim of protecting the jobs of civilians who had been threatened with dismissal by AMSO’s DGSM in December 1992, for refusing to obey orders (above) to make false declarations about airworthiness and financial probity. That is a simple matter of record, and DIA reaffirmed this when they sent me my own copy. Under FoI, a few years ago MoD confirmed the original no longer exists, as it was destroyed after being marked “No Further Action”. Of 19 recommendations, #13 stands out as implementing it would have nipped the airworthiness failings in the bud. Most of the rest relate to (lack of) financial probity, a euphemism for staffs being instructed to commit fraud.

You make an excellent point about C130. First, I’d say I’ve never claimed any age was “golden”. That was a phrase coined by Haddon-Cave after permitting a retired Chief Engineer to judge his own case. Haddon-Cave offered no evidence to support his claim, but completely ignored evidence to the contrary; not just in written submissions, but from MoD’s own hand. The 1992 CHART report is the best example. At a stroke, it clears General Sam Cowan of the appalling accusations levelled at him by Haddon-Cave.



I can only offer an opinion what happened in the days of the C130K, and then J, buys. MoD will not, or cannot say, because they haven’t kept the records. I do know, however, that a long time C130 project manager from the early 80s still works in Air Systems on DE&S, so no doubt he’d be able to cast some light, but has obviously decided not to. In my opinion it was a financial decision. I would not go so far as to claim it was “savings at the expense of safety” of a deliberate nature reported to Haddon-Cave, but the fact remains MoD would have known of ESF very soon after the C130K was delivered, if not sooner, because the US build standard of the day included it and the Lockheed patent is dated 1968. Also, the retrofit was costed. Not long after this, in the early 70s, MoD issued the two DTD specs I mentioned above, which they claimed to know nothing about, despite being called up in Def Stan 00-970.



As I said, I have no problem with a decision not to fit it if the reasoning was sound, and recorded, but what MUST go hand in hand with such a decision is a root and branch review of the Statement of Operating Intent and Use (not called that in those days, but there was an equivalent), against which the Constraints Working Group would assess Operational Constraints and Limitations. It would be absolutely clear to the CWG that not having ESF meant one would be at risk of, in this case, fire if hit by inert projectiles.



Again, in my opinion, this is such a huge Operational Constraint (i.e. a C130 not being allowed to fly at low level) that it would automatically be afforded “Critical” status (not Major or Minor). Additionally, it would be annotated “Safety” and/or “Airworthiness”. This is how OR Branches (DEC) are prodded into initiating programmes. Their priority is set by the CWG decisions. It is the answer to the age old question project managers get from front line - “How do we influence procurement?” You attend CWG, try to reconcile the SOUI against what you actually do, and fight your corner and prioritise what you need to reconcile the build standard and SOUI.



In parallel with all this, lack of ESF should have been more or less the top risk in the C130 Risk Register for nigh on 35 years; also reflected in the Safety Case. If there came a time when MoD’s corporate knowledge reduced so far they lost sight of this (which, as I’ve said, was a dead cert from the early 90s-on), the fall back was the obligation Marshalls were under to advise MoD. They would certainly appreciate that the Safety Case, Build Standard and SOUI could not be reconciled. Of course, this assumes they were under proper contract to maintain the Safety Case; and we know from the various ARTs that this was not the case.

I hope this helps. I strongly recommend you read the HEART (Hercules Airworthiness Review Team) report of 1997. You will be appalled at how variable the approach to airworthiness was, even within AML, at this time. I know many here don’t quite believe all that I say, but every word is supported by the various ARTs (1992-98), plus the audit reports I mention.