JTO
I posted above that MoD staffs were under Instruction to mandate certain Def Stans in contracts. Included was 00-970, Design and Airworthiness Requirements for Service Aircraft (previously, Design Requirements for Service Aircraft).
The point I make in my various posts is that there came a time when, to save money, orders were issued that this Instruction, and others, could and should be ignored. (In practice, implementation funding was withdrawn). But, what we weren't told was, what Standards should we now invoke.
In about 1993 these Controller Aircraft Instructions were to be replaced with Chief of Defence Procurement Instructions (CDPIs). The CAIs were duly withdrawn, but the CDPIs never issued. A few appeared in draft form, but their content would embarrass a five year old. At precisely the same time the Chief Engineer was running down airworthiness with even more draconian cuts (~28% per year, as stated in CHART in 1992).
Bearing in mind that in one sense, a "generation" of MoD staff is the length of a 2-3 year tour, many generations have now been taught that "Def Stans are not mandatory" and "Safety is a waste of money".
I retain full records of an instance in 1998 when I was instructed not to invoke JSP553, 00-970 and 05-123 for this very reason. When I pointed out my legal obligation was to produce an airworthy Military aircraft, so what Standards should I use in their stead, my boss (non-engineer, with self appointed airworthiness delegation
) completely toppled. He hadn't been taught that bit at his half day seminar. I ignored him, as did my contractors, but a few years later, after I moved posts, he over-ruled me and amended the contract. This explained the three main contributory causes in a subsequent BoI, but the evidence was actively withheld from the BoI and Coroner by the IPT.
Personally, I never invoked one of these CDPIs, and can't recall ever seeing one at formal Issue 1. The sensible among us continued to adhere to the "old" rules, if only because there were no "new" ones to implement. You can appreciate that, if you are a contractor and an aircraft related contract is being negotiated, you want to know what Terms and Conditions MoD, your customer, is seeking to apply. Industry were not part of this ill-fated CDPI fiasco (itself a huge waste of money) and in negotiations rightly assumed the only relevant Def Stans would be applied. To the likes of Westland, MoD were a laughing stock. It was rightly pointed out above that, for example, 05-123 is in the new MAA document set, but what the MAA don't tell you is we were told not to use it for over a decade. Question - Why does the MAA not just come out and acknowledge this? In fact, how many of their staff actually know this background? And if they don't, then what makes them suitable and who is training them? I think this pretty important in an organisation whose job is to correct past failures. If you don't know what the failures were, then how can your work be validated? That is not a criticism of MAA staff, per se, but of the system and culture. And part of that culture is an overly cosy relationship with, for example, those who are meant to be independent auditors of the MAA. Witness, the speakers at the forthcoming conference. For example, what are the two audit panel members going to say in their presentations? One of them is talking about "Safety Culture". Does she realise that MoD's approach to the subject was draconian disciplinary action against those who sought to make aircraft safe? The Chair of the audit panel is talking about "Implementing the Nimrod Review". Is he going to start with "The Nimrod Review is deeply flawed, and therefore so too is the MAA's terms of Reference"? I doubt it, because MoD hasn't told him this.
In the case of Hercules ESF, the relevant Def Stan requires a vulnerability analysis to be carried out. You do not have to dream up threats in the first instance - they are listed. The very first is "inert projectiles", which all agree is what brought the aircraft down. The second is "incendiary projectiles", and so on. In the last column of the table is the required mitigation. ESF. It calls up two MoD specifications for ESF, in Fuel Tanks and Dry Bays. It is true that one can choose not to fit it, for whatever reason, but then the Build Standard, the RTS and Statement of Operating Use and Intent must be reconciled, with the Use and Intent parts excluding the possibility of being in a position whereby these threats exist. And if circumstances dictate there is an operational imperative, then in parallel mitigation must be put in hand, accompanied by formal acceptance of this risk. I suggest that 35+ years after delivery is far too long. But that is entirely in line with MoD's stated Risk Management policy of the 90s/00s - Do not mitigate, wait until something happens and then deal with it. Trouble is, when "something happened" people died. That applies equally to Chinook, Nimrod, Sea King ASaC and Tornado, where the record shows the failures were well known, yet ignored for this very reason. Savings at the expense of safety.
At the inquest, and I'm sure Flip will provide the precise words as he was there, MoD denied knowledge of ESF prior to the accident. Can you imagine how ludicrous this lie looked to the Coroner in the face of two MoD specifications that can be downloaded from the internet? As I always say, to get to the truth, follow the lie.
Which gets us back to the forthcoming conference, at which Marshall Aerospace is represented with a guest speaker. (Mr Steve Fitz-Gerald, their CEO and Accountable Manager). I hope someone asks him at what point ESF was offered to MoD, and when MoD declined it. At the time of the inquest, I opined it was inconceivable that the Design Authority would abrogate their legal obligation to point out the UK build standard was (a) at variance with what was considered safe in the US and (b) non complaint with MoD's own regulations; resulting in a Safety Case that could not be reconciled with the SOUI. From MoD's viewpoint, they are required to retain the signed declaration that the regs have been waived, and for what reason. Lack of ESF would have been a major risk, especially given the content of 00-970. At the very least, one would have to annotate the risk register to say why the risk was not mitigated, even if that were "not enough money".