Originally Posted by rudderrudderrat
Suppose AF447 crew experienced a similar somatogravic illusion,
Impossible. Somatogravic illusion means longitudinal acceleration or decelaration gets interpreted as pitch-up or pitch-down. AF447 was flying steadily when CM2 pulled first time and subsequent deceleration was not very quick anyway, mushing around 0.05 and peaking at 0.1G prior to stall (annex3, page 6)
Originally Posted by rudderrudderrat
The simultaneous loss of 3 air speeds, and an apparent Altimeter drop of 400ft (due loss of Mach correction). Now which instrument is still telling the truth?
By the time the aeroplane stalled, each and every instrument in the cockpit was telling the truth.
While the UAS was going on, there was no indication any inertial reference was not available or any display unit failed, so with three attitude displays agreeing, it wasn't supposed to be difficult to fly the attitude.
Originally Posted by Lyman
Whether or not the a/s was demonstrably "accurate" at any time, the pilots could not have known, by definition.
They knew it was inaccurate. They said it so and then it is not overly difficult to deduce if your speed indication as dropped below minimum needed for sustained flight and you are still flying pretty normally, then the indication must be false.
Originally Posted by Lyman
I was taught never to maneuver with trim, trim is trim, not a flight control....
Fact that in every manual, I've used, from C-150 to A320, trim is listed under flight controls. There are proper ways to use it, blanket "don't use it to manouever" just isn't one. It might be applicable for turning the Cessna 172, though.
Originally Posted by Lyman
As the aircraft was dissipating energy rapidly
70 kt indicated (appx 118 true) over a minute.
Originally Posted by Lyman
the THS was not trimming, it was flying the aircraft..
As commanded by the pilot. Per design. Certified. Proven.
Originally Posted by gums
there is no substitute for a clear, straightforward reversion sequence for the flight control system
True, but reversion sequence on FBW Airbi is totally straightforward. No matter what law you are in, as long as you have flight controls continuity and are within envelope's lift limit, behaviour of the aeroplane is strictly conventional, nose & wings follow the stick displacement. Now there's another clue you have stalled; if you can't rise the nose with nose-up input or full stick in roll can't help you pick up the wing. Sadly, crew missed even that.
Originally Posted by gums
So I give Airbus a "D minus" in that regard.
Based on PPRuNe hearsay.
Originally Posted by Lyman
There was no UAS SOP, none.
Report explicitly says otherwise.
Originally Posted by Lyman
Every incident was a fresh abnormal, subject to the unquantifiable readiness of the AF crews to instantly interpret what was happening, and deal with no airspeeds, until the Controls Law changed, which it never did.
AF crews did experience UAS before AF447. Their control laws did degrade to alternate. They survived. What's your point, again?
Originally Posted by Lyman
ALTERNATE did not appear until the fourth screen,
Who cares! As long as proper control of the aeroplane is not achieved, no ECAM actions are to be done! If crew just did nothing aeroplane would have continued to fly of its own accord, it would not have not gone anywhere near the parameters that would trigger the normal law protections. Unfortunately, picture is messed up in the English version but French report, page 96 refers.
Originally Posted by Lyman
The Pilots are quite naturally at the center, and it is exquisitely frustrating to see the slow and measured sculpture of a new urban myth.
OTOH, constantly reproducing the old one about the-guy-whose-name-I-forgot being serious when mentioned that concierges can fly an Airbus is not even funny anymore.
Originally Posted by Lyman
NO ONE knows what the screens showed
Display units integrity is monitored for the benefit DFDR. Guess what fault was recorded. Yup, none. Anyway, roll disturbance was quickly stopped by CM2, proving he was looking at the functioning attitude display. Also there were references to altimeters recorded on CVR.
Originally Posted by Lyman
If there were usable honest cues on the panel, do you think they would have said nothing about the Attitude until GPWS?
They said something about the altitude well before GPWS.
Originally Posted by Lyman
These crew had a dozen seconds or so to get it right, up to the point the cueing got unsussable, imo.....
This crew would be far better off with going-into-fear-induced-stupor option than with what they did. Tragic part is that CM2 believed he was saving himself and everyone else on board with his actions, while they were what killed them.
Originally Posted by Neo Fit
But we do know, with more than 36 UAS events, that it seems difficult to recognize such an event
Well, IAS shows 274 kts one moment and 52 kt next. What could it be? Hitting the anti-gravity field, therefore remaining airborne at speed well below Vs1g?
There were crews that didn't recognize UAS. They did nothing. So survived.
Originally Posted by Lyman
The PITCH was consistently around 16 degrees
It was not. Are DFDR traces really so difficult to read?
Originally Posted by Lyman
No cues, save kinesthetic
Believing kinesthetic cues is certain to get one killed when flying in IMC. Proven again and again.
Originally Posted by Lyman
And none of these experienced airmen are aware of the deck angle? Of course they knew their Pitch was unacceptably high. No Comment, at all? They ignored it?
Weirder things can happen when one is scared mindless.
Originally Posted by Lyman
To believe the BEA report is to believe in the Mad Hatter, and Rumplestiltzkin
Would you be so kind to provide us with plausible alternative?