MAA MILITARY AIR SAFETY CONFERENCE

[Distant Voice]

It seems ironic that the Chairman of the newly formed MAA Safety Advisory Committee, Air Marshal (Retired) Sir Colin Terry was Chief Engineer (RAF) from 1997 to 99 and must have been aware of all the airworthiness issues outlined in NART and CHART that lead up to the Nimrod and Chinook accidents. He was also aware of the requirement to install CWS in Tornado GR4s, as this was specified in the 1998 SDR. And, considering that CWS needs were first addressed in 1990, following the collision two Tornado GR1s and three fatalities, it has to be assumed that his predecessor Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Alcock was also in the picture on the CWS issue. In July of this year, two Tornado GR4’s, and most important of all, three lives were lost in a mid-collision over the Moray Firth.

In fact we know that in 1987, Air Marshal Terry, along with ASAC, tasked the Inspectorate of Flight Safety to carry out a review of the Nimrod fleet. The review was carried out by NART and their report circulated in September 1998. Both CE (RAF) and ACAS were listed on the distribution. Furthermore, it has to be assumed that the NART report was the subject of some discussion by Fixed Wing Airworthiness Management Group (FWAMG) and comments passed up the line to the Defence Aviation Safety Board, chaired by ASAC (Air Chief Marshal Stirrup). There is no mention in the Haddon-Cave report as to what action, if any, Air Marshal Terry and Air Chief Marshal Stirrup took in their respective capacities as CE (RAF)/Chairman of FWAMG, and ACAS/Chairman of the Defence Aviation Safety Board with regards to NART recommendations. Having read the QinetiQ report of March 2006 one can only conclude that very little was done.

So why was this not brought out by Haddon-Cave? I believe that it could be of some significance that when Air Marshal Terry retired from the RAF in 1999, he became actively involved with the Royal Aeronautical Society. In the period 2003 to 2007 he filled the posts of Council Member, President designate, President, and Past President. During the same four year period, Haddon-Cave was Chairman of the Air Law Group of the Royal Aeronautical Society. Under these circumstances it is possible that Haddon-Cave found it difficult to criticise a past President of the Royal Aeronautical Society, and someone with whom he had worked closely over a period of four years. Instead, he gave Air Marshal Terry a glowing report and then directed his criticism to those who followed. In praising Terry, Haddon-Cave implies that everything was fine in 1998/99.

So what has change since the H-C report and the formation of the MAA; very little if the Tornado case is anything to go by. In a 2010 provisional assessment of strategic risks to Air Safety, DG MAA reported;

"Mid-air Collision - a risk during both routine flying operations and on OP HERRICK. Incremental mitigation of this chronic risk, which has a high 'societal concern' factor, has suffered protracted delays over successive PRs since the 1998 SDR. A 'Delete Tornado Collision Warning System' Option is being run in PR11 which would prejudice the Dept's ability to declare this risk ALARP".(PR11 being MoD’s Planning Round for 2011 - the annual budget review)

However, in the DG MAA Annual Report, dated 10 Aug 11, he reported;

"The reprieve of the Delete Tornado CWS PR11 Option is welcome, but there is likely to be more that could be done"

But this "reprieve" is just a paper exercise to give the impression that CWS for Tornado is still under consideration, and therefore the risk can be regarded as ALARP. From experience gained with Nimrod, as long as it can be demonstrated that progress was being made towards ALARP MOD regards everything to be OK. The bottom line is that 15 years have passed since the 1998 SDR, and nothing has been done, or is being done. Worst of all, the same people seem to be running the show, with the same cavalier attitude towards airworthiness and air safety.

DV