The overarching issue we face is the MAA are too focussed on ensurance (over regulation) and not looking at the assurance (sp?) piece (improved/wider training, more trained personnel, more spares attaining higher standards, training for excellence rather than simply competence). Its easy to change the MRP, its difficult and expensive to increase manpower, improve training etc.
Vin Rouge. Agreed. I would say what you mention, above, is part and parcel of the same root problem. All are components of airworthiness.
In a paper submitted to the Defence Procurement Agency’s Deputy Chief Executive (3 Star, one David Gould) in January 2000, the process that is meant to provide these components was broken down and the status of each component analysed. If you read the report you’d think it an annex of the Nimrod Review of nearly 10 years later, explaining the headline criticisms and recommendations in the main body. It concluded that all but one of the required functions was no longer carried out. (Haddon-Cave omitted this bit).
It made six recommendations, of which 5 relate directly to airworthiness. #2 calls for specialist airworthiness posts to be resurrected (having been disbanded in 1993 by the Chief Engineer), noting dangerously fragmented IPTs. #6 calls for two procedural Def Stans to be mandated again, including the one that covers maintenance of Safety Cases and ensuring the components you seek are properly funded before approval is granted to proceed. (Called Requirement Scrutiny). Both had been mandated under our old Controller Aircraft, in his CA Instructions. When CDP and the CE decided to ditch these, without replacement, MoD staffs were taught no Def Stan was mandated; but not told what Standard should be used (which rendered another airworthiness Def Stan a buggers muddle). This led directly to a number of deaths, caused by staffs waiving Critical Design Reviews and regarding Safety as optional, to be ditched if it saved money. (Where Haddon-Cave got his catchphrase “savings at the expense of safety” from. You think he thought this up himself?) .
DPA DCE did not reply.
This report was an internal DPA response to the Public Accounts Committee report “Modifying Defence Equipment”, published the previous year. In March 1999, former specialist airworthiness staffs had been actively prevented from briefing our Chief of Defence Procurement before he appeared in front of the committee. Consequently, his evidence was a mixture of complete rubbish and embarrassing gaffes. However, this was also the day he admitted the primary failings noted in the 1992 CHART report remained extant, which probably didn’t endear him to a certain retired Chief Engineer. Of course, CDP didn’t mean to say this because that same year he upheld disciplinary action against his staffs for disobeying orders not to provide the very things you speak of.
Hope this explains the direct links between our mutual concerns.