downsizer
Are you saying no evidence was presented to Haddon-Cave or Lord Philip by anyone on this forum?
Where do you think they got their evidence? Not from MoD.
What precisely is it you are objecting to or challenging in the recent posts? My last post raised a simple, obvious point.
In the past 25 years (since 13th January 1988, which is the date MoD(PE) found out about AMSO's policy that kicked off the rundown of airworthiness), anyone in MoD familiar with the airworthiness regulations would have known there were serious, systemic failings. Within days, one of MoD's internal auditors reported as such. Other major internal audits saying the same were dated February 1991 and June 1996. All the ART reports of the 90s said the same. The Public Accounts Committee heard similar evidence in March 1999. Since 1988, there has been a long, unbroken audit trail of formal notification to senior staffs of the problem. None was acted upon.
My point is that these notifications should have been coming from everyone involved in airworthiness. They didn't; they came from a few civilian staffs, who were ignored. Actually, their complaints were ignored; the individuals attracted the attention of Director General Support Management (RAF) when, in December 1992, he threatened dismissal for anyone continuing to demand that the regulations be implemented. (He has never made himself public, so it would be wrong for me to name him here, but he's on the plaque in the entrance to Bazalgette Pavilion at Wyton (if it still exists).
Those who knew, but did not notify, committed a very serious offence. Those who ignored the notifications committed, in my opinion, a greater offence. Those two groups of Staffs are part of the problem, not the solution.
The key question today, in my opinion, is what group does each member of the MAA fall in to? If they knew of the problems (and many did), but did not report them, who is to say they have changed this approach? Clearly, to do so would be hypocritical, making the person untrustworthy to hold such a position. MoD itself confirms none of the MAA staffs were in the group who notified the problems in the period January1988 to April 2004 - this has been stated in writing to an AUS and passed to an MP as part of the answer to his PQ.
That leaves those who worked on airworthiness since April 2004. We know that, in June 2007 (after XV230 crashed), Adam Ingram (Minister for the Armed Forces) was advised by MoD's "airworthiness experts" (whoever they may be) that the regulations were being implemented correctly, and always had been. Ingram stated this in writing to the same MP.
In December 2007, when the Nimrod XV230 BoI report was published (which noted systemic failure to implement the regulations) the RAF's Directorate of Air Staffs continued to rubbish claims any aircraft was a unairworthy; thus disagreeing with both the BoI and Des Browne's decision to set up the Nimrod Review.
In February 2008, Bob Ainsworth (Browne's successor) claimed only a few RAF aircraft, but no RN or Army, could be affected; thus ignoring the systemic nature of the failures. Whoever advised him to write this rubbish knew nothing of airworthiness management.
The admission, finally, that those few civilian staffs were right all along came in October 2009 with the publication of the Nimrod Review. Even then, the true breadth and depth of the problem has been concealed; the fact is the truth embarrasses too many senior retired and serving officers.
So, for a mere 3 years there has been general acceptance in MoD of airworthiness failures. One hopes that anyone trained in the subject since then has had this drummed into them; but this remains in some doubt, especially with the current problems the MAA has getting their own regulations issued. I submit that 3 years is not a long time to gain much practical knowledge of managing airworthiness. The MAA's direction and output proves this. There is a lot of hot air but the act of cancelling the only Defence Standard dedicated to maintaining airworthiness was an act of stupefying incompetence. With a bit of luck, those staffs who retain their own copy still secretly implement it, as it remains the bible. If anyone involved in airworthiness is reading this, you do have your copy, don't you? Not just the Def Stan itself, but Part 2 with the 20 Specifications? What? You don't? I didn't think so. D/Stan haven't been able to find a copy of Part 2 since June 1993, when the RAF Chief Engineer broght the final curtain down on the HQMCs. Yet staffs with airworthiness delegation were required to have their own personal copy, issued with their letter of delegation. Does that not tell a story? 19 years without anyone being issued with the definitive, mandated instructions on how to maintain a Safety Case.