Originally Posted by CONF iture
Except from the FDR data, the BEA report is absolutely empty on the matter.
To be told that the THS moved from 3 to 13 degrees in 1 minute or that the THS moved accordingly to the stick inputs and as designed is vastly insufficient
I am well aware I haven't answered your original query from my "
It [the THS] knows no better, the pilot knows best" post, but I didn't really need to get caught up with that "bloody bird" circling again!
To answer your question, though rather obliquely, I defer to another part of the same post where I pointed out that Airbus expected its aircraft to be flown by properly trained and competent pilots.
I know this doesn't make anything right, but part of being a competent pilot is to have a thorough knowledge of the aircraft flight control substructure, which includes the level of automation available from Normal Law to the fallback positions, i.e. Alternate + colors and Direct Law. Likewise, I am well aware that the attributes of the aircraft when in Normal Law have been espoused ad infinitum, but that's the "gilding on the Lilly", and as you know there are "man traps" for the unwary when the automation level degrades, and AF447 clearly revealed those traps, i.e. the Stall Warning NCD switch off, and to a lesser extent the Auto Trim action when in Alternate 2B Law.
The FC training for the A350 will be different, and starting on the ground floor will IMHO enhance the basic understanding of the aircraft flight control structures, and maybe pilots will once more get to respect and understand the advantages and limitations of each layer of automation that gets added.
You claim that the crew of AF447 were badly served, but I venture that poor CRM along with some unfathomable actions by the PF provided none of the service expected by the aircraft, nor the other souls onboard that night.
I respect your right as an A330 pilot to question the data and confusing manner in which the crew became aware [or in this case not aware] of their situation. Though, I'm inclined to ask why the situation that developed at A/P off wasn't resolved as UAS by them? They knew:-
- Entering the ITCZ,
- OAT higher than expected,
- Had started Anti Icing on engines,
- Characteristic 400 foot Altimeter drop when Pitot/Static system suffered short-term icing,
- Lost Airspeeds,
- ECAM - ALT LAW (Prot lost).
The only cue they didn't get, was a reminder that they should refer to the QRH, but IMHO that comes under the second paragraph of this post.