Originally Posted by
Lonewolf_50
"where you and I diverge is that you seem to consider the existence of the technology itself to be the reason for the apparent decline in handflying and problem-solving skills"
Dozy, are you talkin' to me, or the fifteen or so posters whom you joust with on a regular basis?
What you say there is blatantly false.
Not.
Even.
Close.
To be fair, I included the qualifier "seem to" very deliberately for that very reason. Also because I wasn't 100% sure, but that was the vibe I was picking up from your posts. That way I hoped to make clear that you were more than welcome to set me straight if I was wrong.
Done and done.
Originally Posted by
haughtney1
Spoken like a true Techy guy Dozy, manufacturers have an ENORMOUS amount of influence with respect to regulators and operators.
I disagree. This is commercial aviation. Certainly since the end of the '60s, no manufacturer has built an airframe solely on the basis of their own wishlist, because developing and selling a product no-one wants to buy would be commercial suicide.
For the last 3 to 4 decades, manufacturers have developed products by polling customers at every level (meaning management, finance, crew and maintenance) to find out what the priorities should be for the next-generation product. So - breaking down your next section:
Firstly, airlines have been sold a concept that more automated and envelope protected aircraft are inherently safer, which based on past experience is statistically correct...
Let's start by separating automation from envelope protection and FBW, because they're completely different concepts.
With automation the improvements in reliability and safety come from the fact that machines, whether electromechanical or electronic, tend to be better at doing mundane, repetitive tasks than humans. From the earliest wing-levellers through the alt/hdg hold autopilots to the modern FMS-driven systems it is primarily this technology that has encroached on hand-flying practice while on the line - and as you say, statistically every generation of the technology has led to improvements. The INS- and radio-driven analogue units that preceded the digital ones were the first to effectively allow autoflight from wheels-up to top of descent, or even autolanding (which was developed primarily by us limeys because of the operational problems caused by the infamous pea-soupers at Heathrow). The move to digital didn't really alter this practice as far as I've read and it was certainly never intended to be used as a way of de-skilling pilots (though I'm sure it was probably perceived that way in some quarters even decades ago).
Digital FBW and envelope protection is a newer concept in civil aviation, although it's been on the line now for 24 years (36 years if you count analogue FBW as used by Concorde). There's been a lot of rubbish talked about it, largely through lazy or intentionally inflammatory journalism.
Digital flight control in general provides a cost saving via weight reduction (which pleases the management and accountants) and reduces points of mechanical failure (intended to please pilots and crew) by simplifying mechanical implementation through fewer moving parts (hopefully making maintenance easier).
Envelope protection is a side benefit of digital control - particularly with regard to airliner operation and like FBW it is a very misunderstood beast. The press liked to play up the aspect in which it can help cover pilots if they have a bad day at the office, but the other primary benefit - equally important if not more so - is that when the systems are functioning (i.e. well over 99.9% of the time), it can allow a pilot to make emergency manoeuvres without having to worry about overstressing and damaging the airframe. The press tend to ignore that aspect because it has less chance of generating controversy of the kind which sells newspapers.
the trouble is it has created a raft of other issues, some of which include a continual erosion of piloting skills...
Then surely the onus is on the airlines to counter that problem, and on pilot unions and regulators to make the airlines do it.
and organisationally a loss of respect in the profession
What you're talking about there is not restricted to pilots - it is the advent and primacy of managerialism in every aspect of business. Search PJ2's posts for some very eloquent analysis of the problem.
as well as a new set of complex unforseen failure modes that overly clever designers and systems engineers never even contemplated...
The systems (FBW and envelope protection in particular) were specified with pilot input, and none of the systems features were implemented without sign-off from pilot engineers. The idea that the digital systems were cooked up in a closed room by techies and beancounters simply isn't true.
And while grumbling about clever-dick techies may be cathartic, I can assure you that they, like you, are front-line staff and as such, just as subject to the capricious whims of management and markets as airline crew.
Most technology-related accidents have tended to be INS/FMS/autopilot related rather than flight control issues. In engineering terms, the failure modes of digital FBW systems are actually relatively simple in nature because they were designed in such a way as to be an interconnected set of very simple systems which, as a whole, can perform complex tasks. Even then, what the systems are doing is not especially "clever" or "complex". As for "unforeseen", the recent example of AF447 stemmed from a blockage of all 3 pitot tubes - which was not merely unforeseen by the designers and aero/systems engineers, but also by the pilot engineers. Preceding hull-losses stemming from loss of air data had only one or (exceptionally rarely) two pitot tubes blocked at once.
...after all the technology is so advanced and aeroplanes can fly themselves don't they?
Another press-originated fallacy. Don't get me wrong, some industry characters did suffer foot-in-mouth syndrome, but what was printed for general consumption (i.e. outside aviation specialist publications) was shorn of a lot of important context and therefore misconstrued.
I think it's very important to understand that in Airbus's case, the training cost savings to the airlines from going to digital FBW technology were primarily related to having all models in the range from the short-haul narrowbodies to the long-haul widebodies having an almost-identical flight deck layout and feel - i.e. conversion training would be cheaper. *Never* was it suggested that the technology was so good that airlines should feel free to cut back on existing pilot training.
As an aside, the first time I heard that phrase was in the movie Airport 1975 in reference to the Classic 747, which featured no digital technology at all.
the fact remains that aviation is still the cruel mistress when things go wrong...
As far as I'm aware there have been no hull-loss accidents related to the failure of a FBW system in the 24 years they've been flying commercially.
just as it was recently where on a final vector to the ILS at our destination with the A/P engaged we flew through a localised area of turbulence that was powerful enough to roll the aircraft to 30 AOB and disconnect the A/P....pilot intervention prevented any further roll deviation and a departure towards the terrain 2000ft below us.
Well done (and I mean that sincerely). I don't see how it would have been any different on a previous generation airliner though. I'd be interested to know what type it happened on.
[Apologies for the essay everyone!]