iamhere:
Based on the BEA report and the information released from the DFDR and CVR, the crew never grasped that they had stalled the aircraft. That would seem to be why they never put in stall recovery control inputs to unstall the aircraft. My estimation of that glaring error is that when they recognized that the airspeeds had gone awry, they made the assumption that stall warnings that they were receiving were spurious.
Can't prove it, however, so I am left guessing.
A more cogent question might be "why did they fly it into the stall?" I am not convinced that a 5 degree nose up pitch held ad infinitum would do other than slowly fly them into a stall, or slowly fly them to their service ceiling. (Or, that setting might have worked out just fine until the airspeed indicators became reliable again. Guessing, yet again. )
You will note from the BEA reports that the crew had already voiced their concern that temperatures at altitude did not suit their original plan to climb to FL 380 -- conditions had not progressed quite as forecast and they were concerned with that effect on aircraft performance.
A few threads ago, Clandestino, PJ2, and a few others went back and forth about the difference between pitch and power settings based on getting the charts and checklists out, and a default pitch and power reflex setting like you suggest. A discussion worth reviewing.
This takes me to the question you might also be asking: why did not the crew make the informed decision, with their airspeed going awry, to methodically work through the Unreliable Air Speed (IIRC, section 8.110 in the FCOM, I may have that wrong) procedure. We'll never know why, as the two who could tell us that are dead. We can only guess, based on the evidence uncovered in the course of the investigation.
In re the stall: over the course of this three year discussion, it becomes apparent that most airline operators teach and preach stall
avoidance, not stall
recovery, which for the most part is a sound approach.
Ounce of prevention is well worth a pound of cure, and all that.
fustall
Pitot tubes Icing,in this day and age it should be unheard of!
This was the start of the problem,how did Airbus get away with fitting inferior pitot tubes with inferior heating elements?
According to the report and about three years of discussion on this accident on these very forums, to include the ten threads now in the Tech log forum, the improvement to the Goodrich probes had been identified as a required fleet upgrade, and was underway. This was in response to an Airworthiness directive issued by a civil aviation authority.
This particular hull number had apparently not yet received the new probes at the time of the accident.
Why the upgrade was not pushed through sooner by Air France is certainly a question well asked. It is a question I do not doubt that lawyers for the 228 dead will ask in a court room somewhere.
If you dig through some of the informed discussion in the various threads, particularly the first four or five, in the Tech Log forum, you may find all the info you need to answer your question on the probes.
Cheers.