Any chance of moving forwards in capability is wrapped up by the mass of staff work required to alter Safety Cases and the like to bring forward absolutely clear-cut advances that would improve safety & op effectiveness - the process has become a negative link in the safety chain due to the inertia of the whole thing.
Correct.
The very fact realisation has dawned that Safety Cases must (a) exist and (b) be maintained is a step forward. 20 years ago, under the then RAF Chief Engineer (Alcock) instructions were issued NOT to, under any circumstances, maintain Safety Cases.
The natural outcome was that the only Def Stan dedicated to this task was no longer maintained. At the time, those of us who no longer had a job (as airworthiness was no longer to be maintained and the posts were chopped) railed against this. D/Stan themselves agreed with us and made many attempts to update the Def Stan in line with legislation, the last in 2002 when I was asked to chair the proposed committee. My bosses refused this temporary secondment, on the grounds safety was a “waste of money”. It was finally cancelled, without replacement, 3 or 4 years ago.
All the above was presented to Haddon-Cave. He praised Alcock and others.
Some here will note that 1992 is precisely the year the Chinook ART was published (Aug 1992) which advised Alcock and Bagnall that the aircraft was not airworthy. CHART was what would have proved us right, but it was withheld from MoD(PE) staffs, including Controller Aircraft. So, in the certain knowledge our concerns were valid, what did Alcock’s organisation do? In December 1992 we were threatened with dismissal by his 2* 2i/c if we continued our complaints. THAT was the Chief Engineer’s reaction to being told his airworthiness system was shambolic. This threat was repeated, in my case, in 1998; I now know the Nimrod ART had just been published. Again, it was withheld from those who could have corrected the failures, even though the specialist department had been closed in 1993. When the Chief of Defence Procurement advised the Public Accounts Committee in 1999 that the CHART criticisms remained valid, a report to CDP’s Deputy went unanswered and was ignored. My point here is there exists a long, unbroken chain of evidence, much of which is outwith the MAA’s terms of reference.
Today, it is highly unlikely MoD has more than a handful who are even aware of this Def Stan and its accompanying 20 Specifications. The REAL problem is that many who are sit in senior positions, having gained advancement by virtue of the part they played in the rundown of the airworthiness system. That is, they actively supported the Nimrod and Chinook 2* in the late 90s when he, too, disciplined staffs for refusing an order to ignore airworthiness and financial probity. Today, that remains an offence in MoD.
If aircraft offices had people trained in the application of this Def Stan, and the general process, then they wouldn’t need to ask the MAA any questions. MAA’s task should be simple. Manage routine updates to these Standards, ensure correct training (which was stopped in 1992) and fight the cases for proper funding. The very fact they are being asked questions means they are not directing their efforts properly.
The question is always this. Would MAA’s current focus and output have prevented the Nimrod, Chinook, Sea King, Tornado or Hercules crashes? No. They would have been prevented by simple application of mandated, regulations; which were no longer in widespread use because staffs were instructed to ignore that mandate. That lack of focus is entirely down to the Nimrod Review actively protecting retired senior officers and the MAA being staffed by senior, serving officers, whose careers in part depend on their ability to protect the same officers, and their successors who still serve.