Originally Posted by
jcjeant
This speculation seems to still be the most plausible
In fact it is supported by the fact that the pilot continues pulling on the stick despite the stall alarm and the remarks of the PNF
I'm not so sure. There are other explanations, chief among which is the known tendency for pilots to pull back when startled by a warning (including a stall warning) - this was written up in the BEA report on the Orly A300 incident.
Added to this, both F/Os are on the CVR shortly before the start of the accident sequence discussing the fact that they're about as high as they can safely go for the conditions - as such, it's fairly unlikely that the PF would have consciously been pulling up - my personal opinon for all it's worth is that it was an unintentional control input initiated by the startle factor. If the PF believed that the protections would allow them to pitch up and climb safely then the whole conversation about altitude was moot.
Originally Posted by
CONF iture
What I find disturbing is that the system takes the decision to disconnect the AP and switch to ALT LAW based on its analysis of the ADRs outputs but does not think as necessary to keep the crew informed about the reason it took that very decision ?
The big red X on the speed tape and the disappearance of the Vx indicators should have been a significant clue, no?
I was under the impression that troubleshooting via ECAM was intended for when the aircraft is stable rather than during an attempt to regain control. It's also possible that IAS DISAGREE/ADR FAULT was bumped off the ECAM when the ADR DISAGREE appeared, as OK465 attests to.
The ACARS timings are very vague - the final report contains more accurate timings which I'd imagine came from the DFDR.