should thus have been aware that there were no hard protections any more.
Dozy, you say this in retrospect, and with the benefit of three years, plus, of dicsussion of this issue.
You are making an assumption unsupported by any evidence we have.
It cannot be known that he
a) knew that
b) associated that at the moment with his immediate flight problem.
Whatever he
knew
as opposed to whatever was or wasn't written in various manuals, was or wasn't covered in training, was or wasn't reinforced in various training
he may have also made an assumption about what the PF knew (as you are doing with him). This would shed some light on why it seems to have taken him a while to realize that something other than a bit of basic airwork was the problem over there in the right seat.
If he ever grasped that.
The AF447 PNF was clearly monitoring the ECAM initially, but his attention was drawn away by the attitude of the aircraft following the PF's stick inputs.
Could be, and likely ECAM and multiple screens took up much of his attention.
That leaves us lacking in understanding why a particular procedure was not called out and executed: the UAS drill that has been much discussed for the past year or so.
According to you, he
knew that too.
Knowledge not applied often appears equivalent to ignorance, eh?
(See also Scripture, from the Book of James: Faith without works is dead. Or as they say in Missouri: Show me!).
Aviate-Navigate-Communicate is the order of operations for the crew, not just the guy with stick in hand. If the other gent is having trouble flying, you help him do that first, get the rest of it sorted out later.
Well, that's what I was taught in CRM.
And to ice that cake, I'll never forget the day another crew member, in an aircraft with retractable gear, reminded BOTH of us pilots up front that "we ought to have the gear down to land" just before we began our flare. We took his advice, and he drank for free for more than one day.
Basics first.
By the whole CREW.