Originally Posted by infrequentflyer789
Sitting in the back with only theoretical knowledge of how it is flown, but having read most of the threads on this, that idea, frankly, scares the out of me.
Said "UAS procedure" has been discussed to death and dissected over hundreds (at a guess) of posts, and even then there seems to be little consensus among pilots as to what several bits of it actually mean ("if safe conduct..." for a start). In fact, one of the most common theories is that when PF stuck the nose in the air he was actually following part of this procedure. I don't know if that theory is correct (none of us do) but it has as much credibility as any other I've seen as to why PF pulled up.
That procedure could well have doomed 447, and you want every PF to be told to execute it at every AP disconnect
These guys knew they had UAS (cvr) and what they did was pull up into a stall. Telling them they had UAS 10s earlier helps how ? Surely it just shortens the flight by 10s ?
Sitting in the front with: theoretical knowledge, actual knowledge, training, and experience in multiple transport category aircraft....... I think that your fear is unfounded.
The fact that prior to AF447 UAS was infrequently trained, and the fact that the procedure is to do NOTHING except in cases where safety of flight is in doubt should be your clue that judging UAS procedures by this accident is faulty.
There is nothing wrong with the UAS procedure. If you know what the AF447 crew was attempting to do, please tell us, but they weren't following the UAS procedure - at least not the UAS procedure I was taught in the months following their accident.
One might judge AirFrance procedures and culture by this accident, but the Airbus procedure is straightforward. The pitch and power settings Bonin apparently followed were only applicable from rotation to acceleration altitude. If he was trying to follow the procedure, he missed the first caution and the first three memory items. That's not the procedures fault.
Pilots have mis-applied the procedure to use after engine failure at V1, and incorrectly performed high speed aborts as well, but those failures don't damn the procedure. Usually, they damn the training the pilots received.
But this is all basically a moot point. Airbus won't change much because the statistical chances of this happening again are so close zero that everyone is willing to take a chance.
Too bad. In the mean time, rest easy sitting in the back. The pilots are running those ECAM procedures in expert fashion. You just need to hope that they remember to fly the aircraft while they piece together the puzzle the aircraft lays on their table.