Originally Posted by mm43
Seeing that the mere thought of the software being given the opportunity to determine what is and what is not faulty with AD and IR components essential for the safe conduct of any flight, is a step too far,...
I concur. But as far as my input into this discussion goes, you and almost everyone else is failing to see my point. We're seeing the trees and missing the forest.
I am not asking for the software to determine what is faulty or not. I'm only asking for the software to recognize ANY broad area of airdata failure and give me a broad warning regarding suspect airdata information. I'll be happy to let Dozy design me a system if it does just that, identifies suspect airdata/aircraft control instrumentation and gives me an unequivocal message to the effect that airdata/control data is unreliable. At that point, I can go ahead and play pilot.
As I stated earlier, the computer knows that it has insufficient/incorrect data and that it can no longer control the aircraft. If the reason for automation disconnect includes any possibility that airspeed, altitude, vertical speed or pitch attitude is suspect (such as any ADIRU problem), then I think it reasonable for the software to present an UNRELIABLE speed/attitude/etc message. At that point, again, I can go ahead and play pilot. I no longer have to troubleshoot a software package, I can immediately go into pitch and power mode, which is after all the only real way to identify which input is presenting the problem.
Or, Airbus and the world aviation regulating bodies could just change the training to consider any, I mean ANY, ADIRU, ADR, pitot, static, etc, issue OR any unexpected Autopilot disconnect - as requiring the immediate implementation of the UAS procedure. At the present, most of the COM procedures for these malfunctions/abnormalities are systems issues. IOW, training builds a "do the ECAM's and fix the systems" mindset into Airbus pilots. The ECAM, and procedure, focus on pushing buttons and moving switches, not on flying the airplane. For all we know, Bonin was only trying to maintain some sort of basic control while he waited for Robert to "restore" a system they both believed to be in failure mode.
Don't forget, the UAS procedure does not require any action other than AP, AT and FD OFF. A pilots ability to do just that and maintain control at a safe level could be easily determined in a sim check. It can be drilled in training and become as close to second nature as are V1 cut procedures. It couldn't hurt.