Ref post #313
The ATSB report then goes on to say that “Nadi ATC did not, and was not required by any international agreement to, proactively provide the 0803 amended Norfolk Island TAF to the flight crew”. Why is this not a “finding” of the report then? If a TAF is amended and it fundamentally impacts the safety of an aircraft in flight, why wouldn’t it be a requirement to let the Captain know about it? This seems insane! If this is true, the laws need changing and therefore it is a systemic problem and should have been a finding.
It is a requirement to let the Captain know about an amended TAF and there are international standards covering how delivery responsibility is allocated to the ATS units, however the question in this incident is whose responsibility was it to direct the information to the incident aircraft; Airservices Australia or Airways NZ?
One thing for sure it is not a Nadi ATC responsibility as Norfolk Island is located in the Auckland Oceanic FIR so, under normal circumstances, the responsibility should rest with Airways NZ. However, the NZ AIP (Gen 3.3) specifically excludes Norfolk Island as an Airways ATS responsibility because Norfolk Island is administered by Australia and, therefore, by implication the NZ AIP assumes it is an Airservices Australia responsibility to pass amended TAFs to aircraft operating or intending to operate at Norfolk Island. This was certainly the case when there was an Airservices' Flight Service Unit (FSU) located at Norfolk Island who had the FIS responsibility and flight plans were addressed to the FSU to assist them in their directed FIS delivery function.
When the FSU was decommissioned in the early 1990s and MBZ procedures were established at Norfolk Island, the ATS (including FIS) responsibility should have been transferred to the Brisbane FSC and, in my view, the NZ AIP wording appears to reflect this arrangement. However, in order for Airservices to provide a FIS, the Brisbane FSC would require access to all Norfolk Island flight plans including all those not transiting an Australian FIR. Were the relevant aircraft flight plans redirected to the Brisbane FSC once the Norfolk Island FSU was decommissioned? The alternative was to transfer the FIS responsibility to Airways NZ seeing Norfolk Island was in the Auckland Oceanic FIR, which was obviously not done.
To further complicate matters, Airservices' Flight Service function was subsequently amalgamated with the ATC function and, without access to the required flight plans (particularly those for Apia-Norfolk Island, Auckland-Norfolk Island, Nadi-Norfolk Island which do not go through any Australian FIR) Airservices would not have had the necessary data to provide a directed FIS for Norfolk Island. Furthermore, Airservices Australia then changed FIS responsibility from one where ATC provided a directed FIS service to placing responsibility on a pilot on an "on request" or "self help" basis using Flightwatch.
With all these changes over time, combined with the confusion caused by an Australian territory located in a foreign FIR but operating under Australian regulations and standards, I suspect Norfolk Island FIS delivery responsibility probably "fell through the cracks" between Australia and NZ when the FSU was decommissioned in the early 1990s, which may be another contributing reason why the Pel-Air pilot was not aware of the amended TAF on Norfolk Island; notwithstanding the pilot's own flight plan and in-flight update failings.
So the big question now is:
"DID ANYONE IN CASA OR AIRSERVICES ALERT THE CAA OF NZ OR AIRWAYS NZ OF THE CONTINUED NEED FOR AIRCRAFT FLIGHT PLANS TO BE ADDRESSED TO THE BRISBANE FSC ONCE THE NORFOLK ISLAND FSU WAS DECOMISSIONED IN THE 1990s ? AND FURTHERMORE DID ANYONE IN CASA OR AIRSERVICES COORDINATE WITH THEIR NZ COUNTERPARTS TO ALERT THEM TO THE OPERATIONAL IMPACT THAT THE CHANGE BY AIRSERVICES FROM A DIRECTED FIS TO AN ON REQUEST FLIGHTWATCH FIS MAY HAVE ON THE DELIVERY OF FIS AT NORFOLK ISLAND SO THAT THE NZ AGENCIES COULD REVIEW THEIR AIP AND ATS ARRANGEMENTS? I suspect not.
This issue needs to be resolved for the safety of future operations.