Norfolk Island Ditching ATSB Report - ?

[Sarcs]

Compare Jetstar reports to Tiger reports and you will see. Perhaps someone can put a link or four up.

YWIMC (your wish is my command): Should be in this lot for Airbus 320s,330s with the right regos and minus the BOS, Airprox and onboard events (well some of them!)...

http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2011/aair/ao-2011-136.aspx

http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2011/aair/ao-2011-089.aspx

http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2011/aair/ao-2011-039.aspx

http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2010/aair/ao-2010-037.aspx

http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2009/aair/ao-2009-021.aspx

http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2007/aair/ao-2007-044.aspx

http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2008/aair/ao-2008-020.aspx

http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2010/aair/ao-2010-035.aspx

http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2011/aair/ao-2011-073.aspx

http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2009/aair/ao-2009-011.aspx

http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2010/aair/ao-2010-031.aspx

http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2008/aair/ao-2008-049.aspx

Fill your boots with that lot, can't promise you'll learn anything but it is a good comparison and probably shows 'Regulatory Capture' and the MOU in all its glory!

Oh and here is a quote from the Braz training accident in Darwin...

Contributing safety factors

• The pilot in command initiated a simulated left engine failure just after becoming airborne and at a speed that did not allow adequate margin for error.
• The pilot in command simulated a failure of the left engine by selecting flight idle instead of zero thrust, thereby simulating a simultaneous failure of the left engine and its propeller autofeather system, instead of a failure of the engine alone.
• The pilot under check operated the aircraft at a speed and attitude (bank angle) that when uncorrected, resulted in a loss of control.
• The pilot under check increased his workload by increasing torque on the right engine and selecting the yaw damper.
• The pilot in command probably became preoccupied and did not abandon the simulated engine failure after the heading and speed tolerance for the manoeuvre were exceeded and before control of the aircraft was lost.

Other key findings

• Shortly after the accident, when an Australian aviation training facility operating an EMB-120 simulator and its staff were approved to undertake the operator’s training requirements, the operator transitioned the majority of its EMB-120 proficiency checking, including asymmetric flight sequences, to ground-based training at that facility.

http://www.atsb.gov.au/media/3546615/ao-2010-019.pdf

I could do the same for Seaview but I don't believe the mods would appreciate it as the same section of that report holds about half a gig of conclusionary and safety action (SRs)...well worth a read though!

http://atsb.com.au/media/24362/aair199402804_001.pdf

Here's a couple more Airbus events for 2012:

http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2012/aair/ao-2012-116.aspx

http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2012/aair/ao-2012-103.aspx