Waddo, sorry my turn to be lost.
You said the MoK BoI was reasonable and competent. The published report was grossly incompetent (how on earth do you miss the fact the aircraft was not airworthy, a fact even admitted by Wratten a few weeks after the crash?), but the detail I don't know is whether or not the 3-man BoI criticised the "organisation" in an early draft. We know the ROs sent it back to them a number of times. Given what we know, my opinion is the "organisation" protected itself (that is, Wratten and Day protected Graydon, Bagnall and Alcock) by not allowing criticism of itself, so blamed the crew. By no means the only time.
I'm afraid I cannot agree with the concept of failing to address Organisational Fault just because there is no other aircraft of that type in the fleet. If you study the systemic failures on nearly every accident discussed here (e.g. Chinook, Hercules, Nimrod, Sea King, Tornado) the majority of contributory causes could have been avoided by application of core, centralised functions in the organisation. In each case, all failures were notified well in advance - the failure to correct them is an Organisational Fault if ever there was. This principle applies regardless of the operator's country of origin.
I notice the operator has called the Lightning report a pack of lies. If true, another time honoured tradition that characterises the five UK examples above! There is a lot of harsh criticism here of what happened in this case; on the face of it, entirely justified. What was perpetrated by MoD was infinitely worse and I find it puzzling (but entirely consistent) that so few make the same observations about events closer to home.