As a former Chief Pilot of a International medivac operation (Falcon 200) I would offer the following insight.
1/. You're typically operating under the 'guidance' of a CASA FOI who doesn't know $hit about jet operations let alone corporate jet operations...never mind medivac operations across international borders, to the middle of nowhere, in the middle of the night.
2/. But he wants an endorsement on your aircraft for free.
3/. Companies doing this sort of work invariably have the wrong aircraft for the job - they get the cheapest jet they can find whether its the right aircraft or not. That is why you have LR31/35s and Jew Canoes running around the Pacific in the middle of the night - just because you get away with it for a few years doesn't make it the right aircraft. That corporate imperative eventually killed off the operation I was in charge of.
4/. A jet is a jet. In my operation we never, EVER went anywhere without an alternate...period. What the rules say is irrelevant.
5/. Fatigue management systems are a sick joke. CASA tried to make us have one. We spent large $ on getting the program software - ran a bunch of scenarios through it and found it would allow us to do trips with 2 pilots we currently did with 3 (Singapore- Kathmandu-Singapore) and not even come close to flagging us as fatigued - but we arrived back shattered even with heavy crew. I rang CASA and literally told them the fatigue software was "fcking dangerous and anyone pushing its use is a moron" - then the fella I was talking to allowed as how HE was one of the fellas from Uni of SA who designed it...before becoming a consultant to CASA.
"So? - we will be staying on CAO48 - there is NO WAY I or my pilots will be operating under your FMS" It instantly went from being a 'requirement for renewal or your AOC' to "Ok you can keep using CAO48".
I think this young pilot made some very basic mistakes that night - why was the gear down when he ditched? We wasn't he more proactive getting weathers for a place he MUST have known could be dodgy?
He was clearly impaired by fatigue.
I have been as tired as he was...only difference was I wasn't backed into a corner when that tired. Our operation had FAA trained dispatchers (ex SingAF navigators) and our flight plans/wx/notams were faxed to the hotel we were staying at and picked up by the crew at checkout (already lodged by our dispatchers of course). We had a satphone. One of our dispatchers (there were 3) was on duty for the entire time we were away from base keeping an eye on us. Contacting them from ANYWHERE/24hrs a day, via satphone, was as complicated as ringing your mother on mother's day.
This young pilot fcked up -
but CASA/PA fcked up more. I bet young Dom would be the first to admit his mistakes (he virtually did on 4C)
CASA and PA NEVER will. It seems more and more obvious that ATSB doesn't have the staff/resources to carry out its statutory role at any level that could be deemed effective.
After the Falcon operation ended I flew a C441 casual out of SEQ for a few months before getting back into airlines - I did one trip out east of Fiji in it. I arrived in Nadi to find my employer hadn't even bothered to inform the Fijian immigration people I was coming - no accom booked etc. I rang the boss from Nadi in the middle of the night just to wake him up. I managed to smooth things over with the Fijians, find accom, get suitable rest and complete the task safely. When I got back I just looked the boss in the eye and said "That won't happen again".
It didn't.
Looks to me like that was the level of backup young Dom got.
I hope this doesn't permanently effect his career. After that night he will be the safest pilot around - and the first to tell his employer "That won't be happening" and mean it.
Good luck to him.
