What about Sheffield?
I was involved in the research for a programme on the loss of HMS Sheffield transmitted on BBC2 some years ago which if I recall correctly was simply called "Excocet", and I don't think the author of these memoirs needs to feel as guilty as he seems to be. We did not interview the Ops Room operators on Invincible, but it was very clear from talking to those survivors on Sheffield that they were well aware of the potential Exocet contact and had their own problems with command decisions (below Sam Salt's level incidentally). We were also told that the other ships forming the outer screen and getting the same information on the link had gone to battle stations whereas Sheffield had not. Nobody now knows whether an earlier and more "forceful" a warning from Invincible would have made a difference though, and it seems that there may have been more than one AWO who got it wrong that day. If the programme is still available it is worth a look as it gives a wider view of what went wrong on Sheffield, but of course, hindsight changes nothing and what is afterwards seen as a bad, or even negligent, decision may well have looked right and justifiable at the time. It is certainly too late to go down that road.
We were told during our research that it was the PM's decision not to have the full inquiries, that would be normal, into the reasons why any of the ships were lost to enemy action in the conflict. This might have shown more and pointed to the lessons to be learnt, but I have no idea whether this information is correct.