I can do nothing but agree. Adm Woodward dismissed the FAAWC's actions as being understandable because he had seen so many false tracks that day. I disagree. Invincible was 20 miles behind the T42 picket, but had a much better radar in the form in the then new 1022 set. This was much superior in definition to the old 966 sets carried on the T42 picket ring. Once the track was handed over to the 992 operator and verified, this should have immediately have triggered a response. A number of questions need to asked.
1. Where were the CAP stations.? Cdr Ward said that his Report of Proceedings was doctored after the event to hide that fact that he was hauled off on a wild goose chase. Otherwise 801 CAP would have been in a position to intercept. Who ordered this and why?
2. Why was this evidence not recorded at the BOI?
3. Why was the the FAAWC's (in)action not questioned by the PWO, Commander or the Captain if either was present at the time.
4. Why was Glasgow's report which supported the threat assessment by Invincible's Ops team ignored.
5. Why was Sheffield's ops team in a equal or worse state of complacency.
The guy at his console did his job and that is all that could be asked of him. So did the Ops team in Glasgow. To my my mind and as Althenic points out there was this general mood of arrogance amongst some senior officers that the Arg airforce was not a threat. The Staff at the time was more concerned with surface actions against the Argentine navy than they were from air attack. Even though this was recognised as much more likely.
Last edited by Navaleye; 28th Aug 2012 at 00:58.