Interesting read that I had not seen before regarding the attack on Sheffield. I'm astonished that the FAAWC would choose to ignore reports from his own Ops team and that from Glasgow and supporting ESM. The full story is here with the relevant section below. Comments welcome.
The Falklands Conflict - Memoirs
The Day My Life Changed Forever
I was sitting at my display watching it go round when a contact appeared around 250 and at 180 miles, so I waited for the next sweep and there it was again. By this time my actions were routine, I logged it in to the computer and reported it as I'd done so many times before but this time the A.A.W.O (Anti Air Warfare Officer) who commanded the situation turned round and said there was nothing there. The next sweep of my radar came and there it was so I reported it again, now it was at 160 miles but the same thing happened again with the A.A.W. O contradicting me. Precious time was passing us by, we did not alert the fleet, we did not send planes, we did nothing. The next sweep of my radar and it was still there but now it was at 130 miles so I reported it again, this time the A.A.W.O became annoyed and told me I was chasing rabbits. By this time the contact had gone from my screens range to my mates, who was sitting next to me, his job was to track a contact from 128 miles down to 56 miles. He now reported that there was a contact at 120 miles and closing and the same thing happened. I changed my display down to the 128 mile range and to the 992 radar to watch it move closer.
The contact was now at 80 miles and closing. The radar kept on sweeping and the contact kept on coming, The radar swept again but this time there were two contacts. My mate did not get a chance to log the second contact in to the computer as it was only on our radar display for two sweeps when it disappeared under radar coverage, this indicated to us that we were dealing with an Exocet missile which was designed to skim above the waves but below radar coverage. These missiles have 2 functioning radars in the head, one facing down which keeps it on an accurate horizontal plane so that skims above the water at 6 feet which is well under our radar coverage. The second radar is forward facing and homes in on the target. My mate and I reported the double contact and the fact that one had suddenly disappeared and then told the AAWO and still he would not listen to us. He told us we were riding a bike? What ever that meant? Valuable time had passed. I could not understand how our superior could not have seen what was so obvious to us. But it was his call and it was impossible for an acting Able-bodied Seaman to contradict a Lieutenant Commander.
To understand the impact of the situation that had developed it helps to know about some important training we underwent on route to the Falklands.
We trained for a special procedure which was code named Red Alfa. Red Alfa is a drill that prepares the whole ship for battle. We perfected this drill until we could close the ship down and have it in battle readiness in four minutes. That is all it took, four minutes and we were ready for anything with everyone at their station, men at their radar displays or manning their guns, most at their fire fighting stations. This is a universal naval procedure that occurred on every ship in the taskforce simultaneously. Four minutes and you could defend yourselves from any attack, four minutes and then you could dodge and weave an attacking missile, turning at the last minute which could confuse the missile. Another defense was to fire off chaff into the air around the ship. Chaff is the word used for a cloud of silver paper that when fired into the air may convince an attacking missile that it is a better target than the ship, simple but effective. Another defense tactic was the use of Sea dart missiles. These missiles were short range and were basically full of chain. They were designed to explode directly in front of the incoming missile, thus creating a blanket of steel to rip the missile or other aircraft out of the sky. Another important manouerve was to sharply turn the ship to run on the same course as the missile so that it offered as small a target as possible. We even had helicopters that would throw themselves in the path of the missile as a last resort.
The First British Casualty
It was around 80 miles when my mate and I saw two contacts on our displays although only lasting two sweeps this was followed by one contact for two sweeps until it turned and headed back, it's job was done. Still the AAWO did not believe us and the fleet did not go to Red Alfa.
A few more minutes went by then the reports started to come in. HMS Sheffield had been hit by an Exocet missile. The Sheffield was not at Red Alfa and the men of the Sheffield were caught unprepared . Some were having showers or eating their breakfast, some slept whilst others wrote letters to loved ones, they never knew what hit them, doors and hatches where open and nobody was at their fire fighting stations. A missile such as the this one which resulted in the first British casualty of the war is designed to penetrate the hull of the ship before it explodes thus aiming to damage the nerve centre of the ship making it dysfunctional. I always remembered it as 22 men who died that day although later it became known as 20.
Any respect I had for myself died that day along with those 22 sailors. I should of done something, I should of made the AAWO listen to me. The Sheffield never changed course, it never fired it's chaff or even it's missiles in defence. It was a sitting duck. I'm guilty as charged and I'll always punish my self for the death of those men on the Sheffield. I've carried the shame of that day around with me for 17 years and will do until I die. I could of given those men four minutes four times over if I'd stood up and made myself heard. If only if I had tried. The only defence that I will allow myself is that I had been trained or should I say brain washed in the ways of the ranking system. I was an acting Able seaman, only 19 years old, whilst the AAWO was a Lieutenant Commanding Officer, a much older man, supposedly trained to command a battle situation. Who was I to question his authority? Who was I to break the chain of command and go against all the training I had undergone from day one? I was a plebe in the scheme of things and although I had performed my job to the best of my ability it meant nothing when my word was doubted. I cannot forgive myself and feel responsible for what happened to the Sheffield. I let those men down because I should of been strong, even if it meant getting my arse kicked, because I may have given them sufficient time to prepare, to go into Red Alfa, to successfully defend themselves. Surely coping with the wrath of an officer would be better than hating myself as I do now.
After the news broke there was a stunned silence in the Ops room, everything went quiet, no one talked and when conversation resumed it seemed to concern anything but what had just happened. For some odd reason the AAWO came over to our section offering around a bag of sweets, it seemed a sort of conciliatory gesture but we were too shocked to accept this token bribe at the time and it was only later that it came back to me. The AAWO's change of manner even then, signalled his acknowledgment of what had occurred, it symbolised his guilt and seemed an enticement to forgiveness.