Originally Posted by gums
I used to call them "mechanics", but "plumber" works as well.
My friends and I that survived twenty + years flying fighters had the combination of mental abilities, being able to think ahead of the jet, and decent hand-eye coordination. The mental component always seemed to me to be slightly more important than the Chuck Yeager "hands". But being able to fly the plane without thinking allowed folks like me to use what little smarts I had to survive and not become a smoking hole in the desert, or jungle, or a half mile short of the runway.
I soloed many troops that had marginal "hands", but they could think ahead and even if they couldn't hold speed within a knot or descent rate within 50 feet per minute, they were "safe" and effective and survived. 'nuff philosophy for now. But.....
"luck" is when preparation meets opportunity. I didn't see that on the part of the AF crew that dark night.
The interesting thing is: Airbus fans think that the Airbus
does allow them to "fly the plane without thinking" and I think that the Airbus requires me to think about flying instead of "flying without thinking". Perhaps more interesting is the fact that the previous pitot clogging incidents resulting in a positive outcome appear to have been "handled" by my kind of "fly without thinking" crews, while the accident crew appears (to me) to be the kind of pilots that think the Airbus allows them to fly without thinking. IOW's, both sides understand the need to "fly without thinking", but we have diametrically opposed views about the Airbus' contribution to that end.
I don't blame an Airbus style of flying pilot for feeling the way he does, I blame the business, training and regulatory environments that lied to him and told him that the Airbus "flys like any other airplane". See Operational Golden Rule #1.
Nothing I've ever previously flown (numerous commuter and transport category turboprops, various models of LearJets, DC9 and stretch DC9) required me, the pilot, to think about which mode the controls were in in order to properly fly the airplane.
Even with that said, I expect to spend the next fifteen years in an Airbus, then retire. I don't fear it, nor have disdain for it - nor do I trust it. I just wish that the books included a few simple statements. For example, "excepting a state when USE MAN PITCH TRIM in announced on the PFD, the SS is the sole allowable input for pitch. In degraded control states, significantly exaggerated pitch inputs may be required to effect the desired change" .
I've observed too many crews (from the jumpseat) and my own First Officers utilize the "slap the stick" method of control. The manuals should clearly indicate that this is undesirable, instead of the current FCTM language that states, "the PF needs to perform minor corrections to the sidestick, if the aircraft deviates from its intended flight path".
Personal experience shows me that smooth pressure applied to the stick results in adequate control. It also keeps my muscle memory trained to control the aircraft in a way that will be effective in aircraft with either (FBW or not) philosophy of aircraft control. The pilot who is trained to make minor corrections AS PER THE FCTM, is IMHO, poorly prepared to deal with situations that require true aircraft control inputs.