Originally Posted by TTex600
your point has nothing to do with mine.
It's not a point, it is a parable.
Originally Posted by TTex600
You could save yourself many keystrokes by just joining Bubbers44 in his quest to damn the dead.
The point of the accident investigation is to prevent those still living from turning into the premature dead. The assessments of crews' performance made in reports are just a means to that end, not meant to be taken of that contest and absolutely can not be used to establish the legal liability. We live in a free world and one can freely misuse accident reports for entertainment but it would be disingenuous of him to feel offended when warned that he played the blame game using the material explicitly marked as the one that doesn't apportion blame.
Originally Posted by Lonewolf 50
I don't think you understand what an instrument scan is.
Could be. Could be also that we have again reached the same conclusion from the different directions so we are unable to understand and appreciate we are talking about essentially the same thing. Could you please provide your definition so we can further this discussion?
Originally Posted by Lonewolf 50
If sound habits are not imbedded in training, and in type training, and then practiced, then those habits cannot be applied in flight.
Excuuuuuuse me!
What previous training and experience had capt Walter Hughen when he hit the severe icing for the first time in DC-2? How come he came with a solution to icing of the air intakes?
What previous training and experience had Maj Samuel Tyson when his no1 prop oversped between Travis and Honolulu? How come he anticipated the havoc shattered prop would eventually bring to engine no2 so he shut it down before no1 prop fell to pieces? How many times did he practice ground effect flight with two engines gone on the same side?
What previous training and experience had capt Harvey Gibson in recovering from supersonic dive in B727 (we'll disregard the manner in which the aeroplane arrived in it a bit)? How come he did not complain about severe control forces and deflections after the bird was recovered, slightly bent but flying, but rather did whatever he needed to do to land her without much ado?
What previous training and experience had capt Robert Schornstheimer in flying the 732 with much of a fuselage missing?
What previous training and experience had capts Fitch and Haynes in flying the DC-10 without hydraulics and no2 engine?
What previous training and experience had capt Chesley Sullenberger in ditching the A320?
What previous training and experience had Genotte, Michielsen and Rofail in flying no hyd A300, damaged by MANPAD?
What previous training and experience had capt Moody in penetrating the volcanic ash cloud?
What previous training and experience had capt Burkill in double engine failure at short final?
No, you just can't train for every eventuality or cover it with checklist. Those who are fooled into belief everything about flying can be covered with a thick rulebook (which can even less cushion the impact nowadays when they are virtual instead made of paper), soon get bitten in the bum by what ole Karl Marx well described in his aphorism about base and superstructure; pilots without very good grip on basics are bound to misunderstand the advanced, type related stuff and that may turn out to be lethal.
Originally Posted by Lonewolf 50
Pitch and power and performance monitoring to desired parameters is a result of an effective scanm
Effective scan is necessary but it alone is not sufficient condition of flying safely. It is not merely enough for the pilot to see what the instruments are displaying (that's certainly scan), it is also important to create the correct mental big picture from what the instruments are telling (that may be included in the definition of scan) and to know what needs to be done to ensure continuing safe flight (that definitively is not scan).
Originally Posted by Lonewolf 50
Perhaps what you are getting at is that being concerned about a scan breakdown is a dead end if there isn't an actual scan pattern habitually used nor practiced.
No. IMHO, AF447 pilots have seen the instruments, as proven by the reactions to roll, they just couldn't make out what to do with the readouts. They just couldn't put themselves into "We have lost the speeds, so what? We're still flying." mental state.
Originally Posted by Lonewolf 50
There is no recording of what is going on inside the brain housing group, so your mind reading exercise regarding the two forward most seated passengers in AF 447 (is that why you use CM1 and CM2), has limited usefulness, even though I find it amusing in some cases.
Feel free to be amused. While the radical Behaviourism of BF Skinner did not turn out to be be-all and end-all of Psychology, it nevertheless left us with many useful theories and methods, it has shown us that we just can not hide completely behind our foreheads and that our actions do tell about what is going inside our cranium.
CVR recorded what the pilots said. DFDR recorded what the pilots did.
CM1 and CM2 are official Airbus designations for pilots occupying left and right pilot seat, regardless of their rank, function or PF/PNF. It doesn't imply anything beyond that.