Originally Posted by TTex600
I still hold the position that the totality of cockpit visual displays, aural warnings, and ECAM, contributed to the crews inability to determine their true condition.
And I still hold that the totality of the BEA's final report contributed to many A PPRuNEr inability to understand fully what was written. I don't hold BEA responsible for it, though.
Originally Posted by Lonewolf50
Sorry, but you misunderstand. Naval aviation operations require CRM in multi-place aircraft
Completely true if "multi-place" is naval equivalent of civilian "minimum crew 2 pilots" It's different kind of CRM if there are two qualified pilots flying multi-crew aeroplane (e.g Greyhound or Hawkeye) or if there are instructor and student in training vesrsion of single seater (e.g. F/A-18D).
Originally Posted by Lonewolf 50
Your response was a lot of words that added nothing. You can't make a decision to take the controls unless you know when it is needed. To do that, you have to have enough SA to know what the aircraft is doing. You also have to have a belief that you may some day have to take the aircraft from someone else.
I wrote something different? Sorry for misunderstanding, I thought you were promoting idea that in regular airline operations (once line training is completed) one pilot constantly monitors other pilots control input instead of aeroplane. My bad.
Originally Posted by Lonewolf 50
There are some cultural norms to be undone when one is so trained.
True, but it helps in such a training if it is assured that a pilot understands very well that aeroplanes have absolutely no respect for cultural norms & differences and kill everyone who insists on mishandling them with total impartiality regarding the race, hair colour, gender, sexual orientation, age, ethnicity, type of licence or hours flown.
Originally Posted by Lonewolf 50
Or are you trying to say something else?
That in AF447 threads there is abundance of argument from authority and if we want to have meaningful discussion it would be better to concentrate on whether what is written is true than who is the poster that wrote it.
Originally Posted by Lonewolf 50
My point is that without training (see what Tex keeps harping on) the habit pattern and scan patterns, and scan shifting patterns, can erode due to disuse.
So they might be, but what has it to do with AF447? For Finnegan's sake, we have analysis of DFDR and CVR and they show nothing like the alleged "scan breakdown". Both pilots promptly recognized they have lost speed display. CM2 has quickly brought the roll oscillation under control, so he must have been looking at the EADI. CM1 realized that they climbed and advised CM2 to go back down, which he started to comply by somewhat reducing pitch but changed his mind when the stall warning went off second time. There is no trace of control reversals and aeroplane oscillation characteristic of scan breakdown. Right stick was used to fight the roll till the end and it remained nose-up almost all the time indicating at least some purpose, even if, contrary to any modern airline pilot training, it was never verbalized.
It is not they didn't see and read their instruments. Whether they did not understand what they were telling them is debatable but it is certain they had no idea what to do and eventually CM2 panicked into performing the maneuver that proved to be quickly lethal. There were other crews that were clueless but were saved by doing virtually nothing. There were those who made similar unwaranted pull-up but respected stall warning and reversed control inputs. There was many a way out of the predicament even without ever applying the UAS procedure and it is tragic that CM2 has chosen the disastrous one, while CM1 was unable to understand it would turn out to be fatal.