Originally Posted by HN39
If the system had been such that in Alt2B from the onset of stall warning the THS setting had been limited between setting at stall warning onset and 2° nose down (i.e. no further uptrim would be applied), but otherwise as is, i.e. Nz law without high-AoA protections, then the elevator trace on FDR would have been as shown by the purple line on the graph up to the point where the elevator reaches 30° at 02:11:41 (101 seconds after 2h10). Up to that point the airplane's trajectory and the stickforce felt by the PF would have been identical to those in the accident.
You simply cannot obtain a similar trajectory with an identical stickforce with 2 scenarios as different as one with a THS set at 3 deg and another one with a THS moving from 3 to 13 deg.
A simulator experiment would clearly point the difference.
Trimming in a stall is an unknown procedure. It is dangerous stuff.
We need to ask Airbus why they think differently.
As the BEA avoids asking the tough questions, we need to do it.