Originally Posted by korrol
He’s right - but if you feed pilots air at a cabin altitude of 8000 feet (much lower in oxygen content than air at a real altitude of 8000 feet) then when the chips are down crews will make mistakes - and they did.
Almost every crew nowadays is fed 8000ft air. That most flights end uneventfully and large majority of emergencies are dealt with properly completely rebukes your theory but thanks for the entertainment.
Originally Posted by Organfreak
If you said anything like that to a pilot's face in a bar, you'd get your lights punched out.
Nice argumentation there. Not.
Originally Posted by CONF iture
Interested in the FULL story, not a partial one, that's it.
How about impartial?
Originally Posted by mike-wsm
I am not a pilot and have no qualification beyond a vaguely relevant degree. I never fly.
Who cares who you are! Amateurs or non-aerospace professionals did contribute significantly to discussions here.
Originally Posted by mike-wsm
You seem to be falling into the simplistic trap of assuming the elevators and THS were behaving normally. They weren't.
However, this is plainly false.
Originally Posted by CONF iture
Autotrim all the way as long as the data are believed to be reliable.
Inertial data. Per design. Write to EASA if you want to have it changed.
Originally Posted by CONF iture
You did mention a few times AMS, but I am not sure you fully grab the complexity behind the erroneous data and what could be the possible consequences for the Airbus scenario ...
Need to fly pitch and power and disregard the host of false alarms, perchance? How complicated is that?
Originally Posted by TTex600
Yes, he will need a lot of force to lower the nose
Here:
G-THOF serious incident at Bournemouth. A lot of force, thou sayst? No force could lower the nose and the crew didn't remember to use the manual trim.
The way many a PPRuNer glosses over the fact we need to have very powerful THS in modern turbofan transports and that when mistrimmed they can be lethal on any aeroplane, not just on Bus, would have me worried about the knowledge level in today's cockpits if it weren't for the red warning at the bottom of this page.
Originally Posted by CONF iture
To the contrary, if the normal operation of a system is a contributory factor in the crash, the report is the very place where that system has to be analyzed.
It was. Conclusion was it behaved as expected and no recommendations to change it were made. Something wrong with it?
Originally Posted by Retired F4
When the aircraft is descending, and you want it to return to the assigned FL, you have to climb. For that you have to raise the nose (SS NU) and maybe you have to add power (TOGA). If 5° pitch is not enough, lets use more........
...until you zoom through your initial altitude and then bust it by 2500 ft with rate reaching 7000 fpm? Wouldn't you agree that we may call such a feat "overreaction"?
Originally Posted by TTex600
It seems painfully obvious that the crew handled the UAS event incorrectly and unprofessionally, but we still need to understand why they didn't put "the stick forward until the nose arrives there where you want it".
They had no clue what to do.
Originally Posted by Ian W
There is no prestall buffet or normal handling effects if you pull into a hammer-head stall or tail slide this was not far short of that.
At it's best, AF447 was measly 72.1° short of vertical, which is quite a bit of stretch to call "not far short of". Aeroplane never stalls in properly executed hammerhead and is only briefly stalled at very low speed during during tall slide, thence no buffet. Thank you for putting forward this entertaining and quite false theory.