The drumbeat at the beginning was "do nothing". At a/p drop, that was the first the crew knew something was up. With a roll excursion of four degrees per second, and a bobbing nose, the consensus for another several months was "do nothing". Eventually, and grudgingly, the consensus changed, and people here started to instead assess, "PITCH UP". The a/c needed immediate controls, it was obvious, then in spite of BEA noting "mostly ND inputs" post STALLWARN #1, it was "full back stick, what in the world".....
This thread has some time on it, perhaps eventually the last of the hold outs will let go of "30 other crews survived, what is the big deal?"
ICE was never a known fact, from the beginning, it was merely "likely" (BEA).
The Autopilot on the A330 has maneuvering limits, and when they are exceeded, it quits, into NORMAL LAW). BEA never took the time to address what may have occurred, except for the "likelihood" of water ICE.
This report is a shepherd by default, herding people toward conclusions that must be arrived at independently....there is NO EXCUSE for the foot dragging re: "vitesse douteuse..." whether these Pitots crapped out, or not, NO EXCUSE....
I (we) are in receipt of an enhanced trace of the AUTOTRIM between ap loss and STALL. What does one make of it? "excursions" of less than one degree, with mesas of linger at one second? Shortly after the discussion turned to THS one year ago, takata dropped out.....the drill at the time, was the THS was inhibited, possibly by G......
If the THS was trimming, we could unwind the trace and intuit the SS positions..
Then what do we trust, the SS traces? Or the record of TRIM on the THS trace?
If THS, the elevators were deflected to FIVE degrees PITCH? Mystery......
TTex, do you have a theory re: MAYONNAISE? With a rapid movement of the SS can a pilot defeat the AUTOTRIM? Is it an ad hoc method to avoid Autotrim?
I simply do not understand why there is the need for this trim when maneuvering, instead of cruising.....