Clandestino
I'd rather have my posts checked for accuracy than arrogance but I can live with such an evaluation.
Then how about the next post or some others. Accuracy?
Clandestino
You can start agreeing. Aeroplane was flightpath stable
It was flightpath stable in the pitch axis, roll axis being in roll direct.
BEA Final report
When the autopilot disconnected, the roll angle increased in two seconds from 0 to +8.4 degrees without any inputs on the sidesticks. The PF was immediately absorbed by dealing with roll
Originally Posted by Retired F4
Therefore in a decreasing speed situation the computers would have ordered a NU command to the elevators and finally also to the THS in order to maintain 1 g flightpath even without the command from the SS.
Clandestino
Irrelevant to case we are discussing, too. Stick was not neutral but heftily pulled back.
Not irrelevant in context to wrong statements like DW´s post. How about commenting on this wrong statement instead of trivializing my answer?
DozyWannabe
THS was at 5 degrees NU at apogee. If the crew had levelled off it would have stayed there and reoriented itself.
Clandestino
Let me explain how it works in the real world: loss of control, aeroplane shaking and warning system shouting "STALL STALL STALL" are symptoms of stall.
In the real world of air transport flying LOC´s are not common and recognition of high altitude LOC seems to be dubious, due to never trained (only in low altitude) and never talked about. Your simple and mighty true recognition method works well as mentioned in fighter country, but seems to be lacking success in this situation and also in other LOC events, therefore BEA elaborateed as follows:
BEA Final Report
From the previous events studied (see 1.16.2 and 1.16.8.4) it is clear that almost all the crews that heard the stall warning considered it to be surprising and irrelevant. These judgements may be explained by the lack of awareness of the margins in relation to the trigger threshold of the stall warning and by not knowing the triggering conditions of the warning, which are a function of the angle of attack and Mach.
BEA Final report
It should be noted that, during this forty-six second period between the autopilot disconnection and the STALL 2 warning, the C-chord warning sounded for a total duration of thirty-four seconds, thirty-one seconds of which as a continuous alert, and the STALL warning sounded for two seconds. The C-chord alert therefore saturated the aural environment within the cockpit. It was not cancelled by the crew. This aural environment certainly played a role in altering the crew’s response to the situation.
BEA Final report
The crew never referred either to the stall warning or the buffet that they had likely felt. This prompts the question of whether the two co-pilots were aware that the aeroplane was in a stall situation. In fact the situation, with a high workload and multiple visual prompts, corresponds to a threshold in terms of being able to take into account an unusual aural warning. In an aural environment that was already saturated by the C-chord warning, the possibility that the crew did not identify the stall warning cannot be ruled out.
BEA Final report
On the other hand, in the absence of airspeed information known to be reliable, it is possible that the PF thought that the aeroplane was in an overspeed situation, notably due to his interpretations of several clues:
- ˆˆThe aerodynamic noise,
- ˆˆThe buffeting, that he might have interpreted as being due to high speed,
- ˆˆThe speed trend arrow on the PFD, which at that time indicated acceleration.
Originally Posted by Retired F4
Sometimes it looks like holey ground to even start a discussion on a subject, and the then introduced A v B flaming trivializes the further discussion without ending at any usefull result.
Clandstino
I would count my amusement as an useful result but everyone else is free to disagree.
Thank you for this insight into your motivation for being on this forum. It serves aviation in one way or the other.