PPRuNe Forums - View Single Post - AF 447 report out
View Single Post
Old 14th Aug 2012, 22:27
  #788 (permalink)  
Clandestino
 
Join Date: Feb 2005
Location: Correr es mi destino por no llevar papel
Posts: 1,422
Received 1 Like on 1 Post
Originally Posted by Retired F4
Although that post and similar others were not directed to me, i comment on them.
They were not directed at person but at the claims that person made. I found your urge to comment on it interesting.
Originally Posted by Retired F4
They are very personal and disrespectful to the adressed poster, do not contribute to the thread and are not necessary at all.
IMHO they show just the right amount of respect towards the amusing ideas showing severe detachment from reality that are supported by nothing more than "I'm a pilot". Again, it was statement I was responding to, not the person.

Originally Posted by Lonewolf 50
Wrong answer, amigo.

I used to teach this stuff (to some seriously ego endowed pilots) and had it taught to me (as a seriously ego endowed pilot) while in the Navy. We learned a lot of our CRM from commercial aviation, specifically the airlines.
There are similarities and differences between naval aviation training and regular airline operation. It is very useful to recognize them properly.

Originally Posted by Lonewolf 50
CRM 101: if the other pilot is AFU, you have to recognize that and act to make the situation better. This may include actions like taking the controls in those {hopefully} rare occasions that it is necessary. Usually you help him get back into the problem and get back to flying right.

You can't do that unless you assess how well the other pilot is doing if things are not going well, or if he isn't flying right.
True but it's far from being the whole truth. Focusing on the details while ignoring the big picture can be counterproductive. Issue is how one recognizes, as assisting pilot, that flying pilot is overwhelmed. Well, that is the key issue that is happily overlooked by many when discussing AF447: first one has to recognize that the aeroplane has gone astray, then to diagnose whether PF is exercising proper control. From reactions of CM1, it is obvious he was oblivious to the gravity of the situation so after warnings to CM2 to go down, which CM2 did not obey, he stopped questioning what the CM2 was doing. Only thing he could muster was calling the old man to get him out of the mess he did not understand.

Originally Posted by Lonewolf 50
I am pretty sure that you know better than that off hand remark you made, in bold, since you do multi-place aricraft flying for a living, and IIRC, are a Captain.
You shouldn't be. I don't. Why do you believe what you read in personal info?

Originally Posted by ap 08
My conclusion: any aircraft with sufficiently high wing loading can potentially enter "deep stall" - a freefall mode, from which it is not possible to recover...
Your conclusion is distinctly at odds with what happened in the real world to many an aircraft with high wing loading and the way it was made has spared me the effort to scroll the title page down to Jet Blast.

Originally Posted by Carjockey
Why was the automated system not programmed to adequately inform the pilots of their exact situation
Because it cant be. What makes ECAM/EICAS/CCAS or any other alerting system excellent and reliable watchdog when dealing with simple and outright failures is the exactly the same thing that makes them hysterically bark "wolf" when presented with any false air data. Professional pilots are supposed to be aware of it. That many an aviation enthusiast has noticed it only after major accident is slightly amusing. Some outraged reactions even more so.

Originally Posted by TTex600
They never initiated the UAS procedure. Why? - that is the only real question.
Incapacitation. Both pilots have commented that there was no good display of speed just a couple of seconds after AP dropped out. Soon after one started sulking, the other tried to achieve pitch that would eventually put the aeroplane in the low earth orbit, had the engines and wings found the plan agreeable.

Originally Posted by Lonewolf 50
If you habitually fly with reference to the tapes and airspeeds, I can see a bit of difficulty in wrenching your self out of that mental mode and establishing an alternate scan to keep yourself flying on a stable path and course. Airspeed is a key element of any instrument scan and cross check.
So are we supposed to crash when it's gone or fly attitude+power?

Originally Posted by Retired F4
Therefore in a decreasing speed situation the computers would have ordered a NU command to the elevators and finally also to the THS in order to maintain 1 g flightpath even without the command from the SS.
Correct. Irrelevant to case we are discussing, too. Stick was not neutral but heftily pulled back.

Originally Posted by Retired F4
But this input didnt worsen the situation imho.
Errr.. you do realize CM2 pulled after the stall warning fired and aeroplane obeyed into self-destruction?

Originally Posted by Retired F4
To recognize an stall when you dont expect it is a very challenging task.
Let me explain how it works in the real world: loss of control, aeroplane shaking and warning system shouting "STALL STALL STALL" are symptoms of stall. Fighter pilots could explain it even better than me, they are used to fly nearer the lift edge of the envelope than transport pilots and recognizing the unexpected stall for them is often the matter of difference between eventually reaching honourable discharge or getting full honours funeral.

Originally Posted by Retired F4
Thatīs a oversimplified version of cure. As i assume, that you drive a car, it would equal an advice to stay on the street to avoid hitting a tree along the road.
I find it quite correct, actually I find usual argument "They stalled because they feared overspeed" roughly equivalent to "He feared going off the side of the road so he swerved into oncoming traffic".

Originally Posted by studi
I guess most airbus pilots stay away from the discussion because it became some sort of intellectual ma********on.
Succinct and accurate description of about 85% of the debate we had so far.

Originally Posted by Lonewolf 50
One more tool in the tool box, to be used when necessary.
They couldn't use the pitch to save their lives. They didn't react to stall warning. They were unable to comprehend that aeroplane above its performance ceiling can go just one way and choice is just whether it will go down messy or orderly and now they are supposed to be somewhat able to pay attention to alpha gauge.

Originally Posted by Lonewolf 50
ONe part of the mishap that concerns me is what looks like a non-trivial CRM breakdown between LH and RH seat.
What breakdown? It was more like total evaporation. There was no resource to manage. given the utterances recorded on CVR, they recognized their speeds were unreliable but had not a slightest idea what to do.

Originally Posted by ap08
but the system also responded inadequately (autotrim put the airplane in unrecoverable stall;
Who made the inputs that caused the trim to go full nose up?

Originally Posted by ap08
Also, if I understand correctly, autotrim was NOT supposed to work this way.
It is.

Originally Posted by TTex600
Does "any other plane" remove power awareness from its pilot with its non moving power levers?
In real life, pilots check the power by looking at their power gauges.

[quote=Dozy Wannabe]You can see the power settings by looking at the "donuts" on the centre MFD - you know this![/quoteNo, I don't! Doughnut is power lever position, it is demanded, not delivered power - that's why it is important to check the power on the instrument and not particularly important to have backdriven thrust levers. Applicable to anything, as even C-150 throttle cable can slip occasionally and you don't get full power when firewalling it.

Originally Posted by Lyman
SS traces mean what?
Position of sidestick(s).

Originally Posted by Retired F4
Can we somehow finally agree on that and then stopp argueing on the basis of completely false statements like yours above?
If we stopped introducing false claims into debate, we wouldn't have two AF447 threads, let alone 10. We'd be spared many an amusing moment, too.

Originally Posted by FullWings
What are the most important things that pilots need to do/understand to avoid similar accidents? Here are a few I can think of, in no particular order:
Very correct. Problem is that it is (even legally) assumed that pilots jumping through all the training hoops will be proficient in everything you listed. Unfortunately, it is not always so.

Originally Posted by TTex600
If it was as simple as a simple AP disconnect and thrust lock of a perfectly stable flying machine, I would agree.
You can start agreeing. Aeroplane was flightpath stable. If the crew selcted the attainable flightpath, they would have survived. If the crew went totally catatonic, they would have survived and we would be discussing the AF447 with the same intensity we discussed all other UAS cases on 330/340.

That's zilch.

Originally Posted by Lyman
The text says essentially that the controls worked properly, nothing about the logic.
In the real world, accident reports are published to further the flight safety and are not written for public entertainment. Aerospace professionals know it means aeroplane was behaving as designed and certified, therefore as expected. If they want to find out more, they can look it up in relevant manuals and certification requirements but they need to know their basic stuff about flying very well to make any sense out of it.

Originally Posted by Dozy Wannabe
The vast majority of those who subscribe to the belief that Airbus FBW was intended to sideline pilots will not be shaken from that belief by the circumstances of the incident you posted.
You really believe that all folks that keep on promoting views incompatible with the way things really work are interested in serious discussion?
Originally Posted by TTex600
Had the pitots been changed, this accident would never have happened.
Unreliable airspeed doesn't happen just because of Thales probes getting clogged by ice crystals. Pilot who can't handle it has no business being in cockpit.

Originally Posted by TTex600
The aircraft should degrade into a state that humans can easily, quickly understand and control. Not the opposite. That's neither an Airbus, nor Boeing, nor Bombardier, nor Embraer comment. It's just what I want to see.
Pilot that can't easily and quickly understand and control his aeroplane in degraded state has no business being in cockpit. Aviation can not be dumbed down to average Joe level.

Originally Posted by Retired F4
a system of A and the functioning logic of this system was being discussed
...with massively entertaining results, if I may add.

Originally Posted by Retired F4
Sometimes it looks like holey ground to even start a discussion on a subject, and the then introduced A v B flaming trivializes the further discussion without ending at any usefull result.
I would count my amusement as an useful result but everyone else is free to disagree.

Originally Posted by Retired F4
What i know for sure is, that such a discussion will improve the knowledge base and the understanding of discussed systems and flying itself significantly, if we stick to facts and do not make things up to serve our own biased mind.
Agree.

Originally Posted by Retired F4
But let me add also that those, who think they know all about their aircraft after a few years of uneventful flying and are not willing and not able to see the necessity to know more and to gain more expierience will hopefully have a lot of luck when running out of knowledge and expierience.
Woe to them! Also to those who learn about their aeroplane from old wives' tales that have made bulk of posts here.
Clandestino is offline