Originally Posted by Contacted
Look. The aircraft was flying fine (attitude/thrust) when the technical problem occurred.
After two minutes of pilot input, in wasn't flying. It was falling.
Despite 2 wings, 2 engines, an artificial horizon, 35,000 feet of airspace and sufficient control authority.
Full wings is spot on:
Originally Posted by FullWings
- Have a working knowledge of performance attitudes in all phases of flight.
- Pulling back on the controls for an extended period of time is rarely the solution to a problem.
- Crew communication/interaction is vital during an emergency in a multi-pilot aircraft.
- Know how your airframe behaves when you lose part/all of the protections/automation.
Please continue with the long technical discussions.
I just feel we need to re-iterate, once in a while, the vital tasks of the pilots.
The importance of flight path control and cockpit co-ordination in those first few critical moments of a serious non-normal. Amongst all the bells, whistles, lights, g forces, etc.
I'm not convinced the importance in which this is taught in simulator training is really hitting home.
Absolutely agreed (with Full Wings and yourself Contacted ) , while making the point that their failure to recognize is key. Yes the aircraft was flying just fine before the technical problem occurred, and it is painfully obvious from CVR transcript that the crew failed to perform in a professional (or even amateurish) level; but as a pilot who observes our industry and is concerned for future generations of pilots, I feel strongly that we do everything possible to prevent another such accident. In that light, we do the dead crew and their infortunate passengers a dis-service if we ignore the role the machine played in their failure to recognize what failed and how to properly deal with that failure. .
Their machine failed them during two separate phases, first in the seconds after the A/P disconnect the displays/indicators/attention getters/attention demanders didn't give clear and pointed information, and secondly the FD inconsistency confused the PF during his attempts to control the aircraft. I say this because I believe I'm repeating what the BEA wrote in the final report. I do not place blame on the system because it offered a confusing environment, but I think that the confusion was a significant factor in their failure to recognize their true state.