studi, perhaps one reason you can't explain what the pilots were doing is that we don't know what they were looking at. We don't know the actual scan pattern the man in the Right Hand seat was using, but some informed guesses can be made. I find the BEA's suggestion in re AoA indication to be of merit. One more tool in the tool box, to be used when necessary.
If you reach an understanding of what he was seeing on his display and what he was then looking at as various thing changed mode or failed to display, you can get an idea of what may or may not have been wrong in training and habit patterns, and on what basis he made various decisions in trying to handle the aircraft when the Robot conceded control to him.
ONe part of the mishap that concerns me is what looks like a non-trivial CRM breakdown between LH and RH seat. That can happen to any crew, in any type aircraft, regardless of what sort of robot assisted flying system is in place.
I suspect that Air France, Airbus, and perhaps significant sectors of the industry do not feel incentivized to make in depth systems knowledge a part and parcel of their pilot force. If nothing else, this crash ought to wake up anyone in management to how bloody important it is to know your aircraft inside and out, and in particular, anything and everything to do with flight controls, which in FBW aircraft means How The Robot Works. If the robot gets a share of flight control manipulation tasks, the pilot has to know what's going on, and when, without ambiguity, since at any moment the robot may admit that it hasn't got what it needs to fly and needs the pilot to take care of it.
Last edited by Lonewolf_50; 10th August 2012 at 14:41.