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Old 10th August 2012 | 10:23
  #702 (permalink)  
RetiredF4
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Joined: Jun 2009
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From: Germany
studi (my bolding)
If the Turkish 737 in Amsterdam would have been an A320 in alternate law, they would have had much better survival chances. When speed would become too low, the plane would have induced a slight nose down moment to maintain safe speed.
You are saying, that A320 in Alternate LAW has always low speed protection available? AF447 was in ALT2B, communicated by the system as ALT LAW, and no protections left except load factor protection.

Please explain.

DozyWannabe
I'm not denying it at all, but would it not be fair to say that rapid descent despite full power and nose-up attitude would be enough of a clue no matter what you're flying?
Wise words, but this was not the only crew in the past being part of a LOC accident. There is a training problem and a interface problem. Therefore BEA recomends the availability of AOA indication.


Really? I'd have thought that ensuring stability and keeping control inputs gentle until getting a feel for the situation would be fundamental to flight management.
I´m not in the picture to what post you are referring. I never would object that statement.

Obviously "stay within the flight envelope" doesn't cover everything, but following that advice and using it as a baseline surely increases your chances of coming out of things in one piece?
Staying away from work would do the same. Just skip the crap with "staying in the flightenvelope " and replace it with the above quote, and we do not need to debate about it.


military investigation has a reputation for suffering political pressure over and above the civilian equivalent
Are you talking about third world country?

DozyWannabe
Published UAS procedure? Disregarded.
Transient Stall Warning? Disregarded.
Maximum altitude (which had been agreed with PNF only a few minutes prior)? Disregarded.
Nothing new on the planet. In the analysis of BEA not one single crew was doing the complete UAS procedure.
There was no transient stall warning. It was a real warning, which should have lastetd longer, but due to the extreme low false airspeed and therefore shift of trigger boundary it only sounded that short.

Last edited by RetiredF4; 10th August 2012 at 11:18.
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