@roulishollandais:
The approach chart problems probably negated a legal avenue for compensation, but the fact is that the incorrect mode *was* set, and Airbus/Honeywell changed the FPA/VS display on the FCU panel accordingly.
Of course, that wasn't the first time that particular problem had arisen (although it was the first fatal accident) - the first time it reared it's head almost resulted in an A320 on approach to Gatwick landing on Crawley High Street!
The point I was trying to make was that there is a very important distinction that must be made between automation (i.e. autopilot/autothrust/FMS/FMC) and FBW - and that extends to modes. In the case of the Indian Airways accident, the mode problems were related to autoflight (incorrect FMC settings for approach resulting in autothrust going into Open Descent rather than the managed approach path) and not the flight control computers/FBW aspect, which is under consideration in this accident.
Believe it or not, I have no dog in the A. vs. B. hunt either - I just don't like opinion masquerading as fact, and I especially don't like lazy assertions that have no basis in fact (examples of which include "The [Habsheim] A320 thought it was landing", "The FBW Airbus design process excluded pilots", "FBW is the first step towards pilotless airliners" and "Boeing's latest models do not rely on computers for control") being repeated in the public domain.