Aussie MRH-90

[Bushranger 71]

Causes of ADF helo fleet decline

I agree with Tibbsy (Post # 268); it is quite unrealistic to compare the huge US Army organisation with smaller forces. They arguably have a different culture than the other US 'air' arms because they have fundamentally different organisational structures.

Perhaps one dated example illustrates different thinking for Australian air elements. Soon after takeover of battlefield support helos from the RAAF in 1989, Army Aviation began operating Blackhawk with the External Stores Support System (ESSS) and drop tanks often fitted for predominantly low level operations. Air Force advised continuing the practice would substantially damage the airframe, and it did.

But the root cause of the diabolical mess that has since been created regarding functionality of the whole ADF helo fleet seems to lie in failure of the DoD organisation to maintain adequate and credible military preparedness through progressive optimisation of in-service assets. And note the increasing emphasis by the Labor Government on the usability of many assets being acquired for disaster relief and humanitarian roles. Do we not acquire hardware primarily for military purposes and thus need to keep it combat ready?

An obsession with trying to reduce the fleet to as few as 4 types via the absurd ADF Helicopter Strategic Master Plan (HSMP – Projects Air 87 and Air 9000) has been a major factor generating serious capability gaps and the architects of that scheme were the hierarchy of Army Aviation. The intention to ultimately shed the most vital of battlefield functions, utility helo capability (Iroquois/Blackhawk), reflects shallow combat appreciation. That capability cannot be adequately replaced by a twin-engined so-called LUH seemingly intended to be acquired downstream ostensibly as an aircrew training platform (see: http://www.defence.gov.au/publicatio...tyPlan2012.pdf, Page 68), nor will the medium lift MRH90 adequately suffice for utility helo roles and the operating costs for that platform will likely well exceed Iroquois/Blackhawk.

Tiger and MRH90 were inappropriate Howard Government acquisition decisions; but what is needed now is some bold decision-making to scrap the damaging hugely costly HSMP and restore some lost capabilities by diverting modest funding into optimising the Blackhawk, Kiowa and what remains of the Iroquois fleet. Perhaps just put the Tiger and MRH90 into storage as they are going to suck up a huge slice of Army's overall budgetary funding to the detriment of primary functions.

If DoD can find money for ships to restore run-down Navy capabilities and to donate to Customs (the Skandi Bergen), then funding can surely be recast to restore vital utility helo capacity. A burning question is though, are the Service Chiefs prepared to acknowledge the diminishing operational status of the ADF helo fleet?

Interestingly; Sikorsky-Helitech, who have been awarded a contract for further maintenance of Blackhawk/Seahawk, are also the Bell Helicopter authorised facility for Iroquois and Kiowa engineering services (see: Sikorsky - Certifications/ Approvals).