Originally Posted by henra
It only autotrims into a stall if:
1) A serious degradation of systems occurs (Alternate Law 2). (This is by definition a clearly exceptional case) and
2) The pilots continuously (for quite some time) point the Nose of the Airliner where it absolutely doesn't belong.
1) To work properly, automation and protections need reliable data.
If data are known to be corrupted the simplest thing to do would be to cancel automation : Direct law - No autotrim
Every Boeing pilot flies that way in manual flight, is it an issue ?
2) ALT LAW + Autotrim amplify the severity of the stall.
Sidestick neutral, the THS would have rolled the same way.
Originally Posted by Lonewolf_50
In the case of Alt Law 2, it appears that A330 control logic allows for the chance that the robot is wrong, since it already notes some odd signals or sums already, on the way to degradation. That's a conservative approach, and one to my liking.
Same reply that 1)
The conservative approach would be to make sure that automation stays out of the way when data are identified as unreliable.
PS : Thanks to both of you for you reply.
It is unacceptable the BEA simply ignores the matter.