Lyman
I am of the opinion that the crew were unaware they dealt with UAS for precious seconds, and made decisions based on their belief that NORMAL LAW obtained, and this is what started the crucial disconnect between the PF SS and actual PITCH.
My bolding
BEA 2.1.2.4 Identification of the situation
..........In the case of the accident, the crew did not associate the loss of displayed speeds and the associated procedure. This may be explained by the difference between the symptoms that appeared during the training session that they had followed a few months previously and those that appeared during the event. In particular, the high number of ECAM messages that the PNF called out should be compared with the absence of messages in the training session scenario......
.......In the absence of a specific message expressing detection of unreliable speed by the systems, the crew was unable to identify any logical link between the symptoms perceived and these ECAM messages. The impression of an accumulation of failures created as a result probably did not incite the crew to link the anomaly with a particular procedure, in this case the “Vol avec IAS douteuse” procedure........
.........The symptoms perceived may therefore have been considered by the crew as anomalies to add to the anomaly of the airspeed indication, and thus indicative of a much more complex overall problem than simply the loss of airspeed information.
Incomplete excerpt, bolding by me, please read the report for full version
BEA 3.1 Findings
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Although having identified and called out the loss of the airspeed indications, neither of the two copilots called the “Unreliable IAS” procedure.
ˆˆThe Flight Directors did not disconnect.
ˆˆThe crossbars disappeared and then re-appeared on several occasions, changing mode several times.
.......
BEA 3.2 Causes of the Accident
These events can be explained by a combination of the following factors:
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The lack of a clear display in the cockpit of the airspeed inconsistencies identified by the computers;
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Flight Director indications that may led the crew to believe that their actions were appropriate, even though they were not
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The difficulty in recognizing and understanding the implications of a reconfiguration in alternate law with no angle of attack protection.