Clandestino, (#836) "If the safe conduct of the flight is impacted".
I repeat; this phrase requires interpretation, which you make in hindsight. We do not know what the crew understood and decided.
The CVR / report suggest that the crew observed the loss of airspeed information but did not understand the implications, and possibly did not consider any association with UAS. Previous events reported difficulty in associating the situation with UAS.
Assuming that the PF’s subsequent control activity was based on a conscious decision (local rationality), then this may have just been poor handling skills in maintaining level flight, or an ill-judged attempt to achieve a specific goal, - either an inappropriate UAS pitch value or stall recovery as in the ‘alternative view’ (#816).
At best we only have a small snapshot of what occurred in the flightdeck, and can only speculate on the crew’s mental activity. Such speculation could be made to fit many views of the big picture. My alternative considers one of these, particularly in association with previous events, and enquires if there is anything which the safety of our industry might benefit from.
A single view of the situation may not have this advantage and thus is perhaps disadvantaged in future thought and action.
RetiredF4, (#828), thanks. The ‘alternative view’ aligns with the report when the stall is established; the point of difference / interest is the crew’s mental model and choice of action which resulted in the stall.
With either view, the effects of surprise on situation awareness, and background knowledge, flight and CRM skills (including time management) all appear to be significant contributors to this accident.