HazelNuts39
Is there a conflict? The crews that performed the recovery in the simulator did have "a good comprehension of the situation" and of the "manoeuvre that would have made it possible to perhaps recover control of the aeroplane." The engineers that calculated the manoeuvre did make BEA's caveat.
EDIT: In this type of accident the main problem is that the crews do not understand the situation. Maybe there is merit in developing a system that detects a stall and announces that condition unequivocally to the crew. Would an AoA indicator be sufficient?
A conflict? Yes, in a special way i think it is. We might walk into the same trap as the regulators and the operates did and imho still do, in underestimating the situation and overestimating the abilities of the average pilots as well as the hardware. It´s the average pilot on the controls and not the "
extremely purposeful crew" (wording of BEA).
Concerning the AOA indication BEA made a point:
Angle of Attack Measurement
The crew never formally identified the stall situation. Information on angle of attack is not directly accessible to pilots. The angle of attack in cruise is close to the stall warning trigger angle of attack in a law other than normal law. Under these conditions, manual handling can bring the aeroplane to high angles of attack such as those encountered during the event. It is essential in order to ensure flight safety to reduce the angle of attack when a stall is imminent. Only a direct readout of the angle of attack could enable crews to rapidly identify the aerodynamic situation of the aeroplane and take the actions that may be required.
Consequently, the BEA recommends:
€€that EASA and the FAA evaluate the relevance of requiring the presence of an angle of attack indicator directly accessible to pilots on board aeroplanes.