PPRuNe Forums - View Single Post - AF 447 Thread No. 9
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Old 29th Jul 2012, 22:53
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Clandestino
 
Join Date: Feb 2005
Location: Correr es mi destino por no llevar papel
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Originally Posted by safetypee
“Both pilots commented that speed display was faulty” (#819) assumes a particular interpretation
How hard is reading the CVR transcript? Seems not very strenuous to me.

Originally Posted by safetypee
The absence of airspeed does not imply URA as depicted by the abnormal drill.
It absolutely does. Let me help you a bit, phrase "If the safe conduct of the of the flight is impacted" is a part of the what you call "drill". No need to go to 5° pitch and climb thrust if crew ascertains there is no immediate threat, but procedure must be performed. It wasn't.

Originally Posted by safetypee
Note similar difficulties in determining an UAS situation in the previous events.
Remind me: how did the previous events ended? What was the factor X that made the difference in outcome? Perchance that only two cases of triggering the stall warning due to crew actions were recorded? That in both cases crews reacted to stall warning by pushing the sticks?

Originally Posted by safetypee
This was to fly a stall recovery based on a false mental model,
You only pull to back stop when recovering from inverted stall. Perish the thought, mental model of stall recovery was nearer to non-existant than false as stall was never recognized.

Originally Posted by safetypee
to miss the opportunity to learn from a wider (fundamental) view of the accident.
I'll gladly pass the option to learn from the aces of the base.

Originally Posted by jcjeant
Of course I disagree completely the idea that you made ​​of justice
Tough. You might find better understanding on lawyers' forum.

Originally Posted by jcjeant
In fact .. without the DFDR and CVR ... a tria is useless or at least a truncated trial
As I said, if you have the vested interest in misusing the recorded data, I won't wish you good luck with your case.

Originally Posted by jcjeant
A simple example is that of a bus , train or truck accident
They are also equipped with a black box
They are not covered by the Annex 13 and all the neat stuff we came up with while trying to improve the aviation safety.

Originally Posted by Lyman
Yet you acknowledge 447 was STALLED all the way down
Yup. Pitch control went to extremes to satisfy right stick G demand, yet it couldn't as speed was waaay below 1.58 Vs.

Originally Posted by Lyman
roll was responsive though excursive, and yaw was certainly in control.
Another dazzling display of inability to understand DFDR graphs. Spoilers, ailerons and rudder followed sidestick/yaw damper inputs and flapped like mad, yet the effect on roll and yaw was negligible, as expected in stall.

Originally Posted by Lyman
Since the PF acknowledged neither call, we can't conclude, (unless a PPRuNe poster) that he knew about UAS or law change.
PF said that there's no good display of the speed. How can one say things he is not aware of while being conscious?

Originally Posted by Lyman
Pilot starts his STALL recovery
...by pulling on the stick once again. No good.

Originally Posted by Retired F4
No clear mention of the buffet phenomenon is ever made.
Is pre-stall buffet really so exotic it warrants special mention in the manuals of the aeroplanes possessing it or we perchance require the aeroplanes lacking it to be equipped with artificial means of its simulation?

Originally Posted by Retirred F4
The combination of the ergonomics of the warning design, the conditions in which airline pilots are trained and exposed to stalls during their professional training and the process of recurrent training does not generate the expected behaviour in any acceptable reliable way.
You are overgeneralizing, which is understandable as you choose to disregard the cases of A330 /340 UAS where crews either reacted properly to stall warning, or at very least did nothing. So survived.

Originally Posted by BOAC
- realise, if you will - they 'controlled' the a/c into a stall and kept it there with the CONTROLS.
Fully agree.

Originally Posted by BOAC
'Out of control' means no ability to manouevre the a/c deliberately.
After the aeroplane exited envelope, they had no means to control the roll & yaw and only option available in pitch was down. Unfortunately, they did not take it.

Way I see it, if your nose doesn't come up when you pull the stik, you have no positive control.

Originally Posted by BOAC
I'll grant you 'out of control' in that they had no idea how to control the aircraft - for a variety of reasons.
Exactly.

Originally Posted by BOAC
Ever flown a Porteous loop?
I have once pulled up too gently, then pushed too hard and flicked off the top of the loop. Does it count?

Originally Posted by Lyman
I brought up the possibility that PNF may have been referring to bug speedslost? Eg. "we've lost the speeds"
Small chance. Go read the report... no, don't read, just have a look at the picture on page 39.

Originally Posted by Retired F4
How could he know?
Why should he know? WIWOA*, drill was to treat every degradation to alternate law as the worst case. What difference would make if it were ALT1? Low speed stability is overridable, especially so with full back stick.

*When I Was On Airbus
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