Still I think that the briefness of the messages can add to the congnitive stress situations more than ease it. Many times acronyms can speed up reading, but under stress it can be deteriorating.
"Between 2 h 10 min 18 and 2 h 10 min 25, the PNF read out the ECAM messages in a disorganized manner"
Surely there could be a better way to get the messages out and understood.
Under stress perceptions do change but that's what training, training, training, (and continuous study and learning as part of one's profession) is for. Such responses cannot be eliminated but they can be reduced by familiarity.
The QANTAS A380 event shows how complex the ECAM can be but that system is extremely well designed and works providing it is followed to completion.
The "better way" is in how the response was made right from the start of the event. The SOPs do not change significantly from type to type. The trained crew response to an emergency or an abnormality is, with minor variations throughout the industry, very clear and very specific:
- Take control of the aircraft, (usually the PF) and ensure stable flight and navigation;
- Communicate: PF announces the emergency/abnormality so the other crew member, (PM), is aware and shifts thinking and priorites to the emergency/abnormality, (where applicable, PF takes radio communications responsibilities);
- PF calls for the "ECAM Actions" first, then the QRH checklist where applicable;
- PM executes/completes ECAM actions, clearing messages as they are completed;
- When finished, PM calls "ECAM Actions Complete" and calls up the Status Page for aircraft and system condition review;
- When aircraft/system Status is reviewed, PF calls for any applicable QRH checklists. For example, sometimes landing data requires modification;
- Secure the aircraft for continued flight or diversion;
- Communicate with ATC, F/A's (through their leader) and company dispatch;
- Passenger announcement, if required;
- Monitor changes in aircraft performance, fuel situation etc, as required.
The popular notion of "startle effect" has some place in this discussion because responses are always going to be influenced by the immediacy of an event. However, these trained responses are absolutely standard and what recurrent simulator sessions are all about and are intended in part to reduce the effects of surprise.
You might google "CRM" as that is the way cockpit communications are conducted when an emergency/abnormality occurs, ensuring a) all crew members are aware of the problem, b) everyone is prepared for what's next and c) awareness is followed by a plan of action and resolution of the problem. The process is about "what, not who", so anyone who senses/sees a problem speaks up and the matter must be resolved to everyone's satisfaction. It isn't a democracy, it is a way of communicating information so that everyone is aware. The captain always has the final word.
Still I cannot help to think that there was something, in the displays, indicators or anywhere that made quite experienced pilots to start moving the plane before understanding the situation.
The barometric altitude reduced slightly and it has been theorized that this was a reason for the immediate, strong pull-up by the PF.
While that may be an explanation for the instant pull on the stick, it does not explain the continued pitch-up and climb in which SOPs and cockpit discipline were entirely absent. As I have said many times, even given the pull to stop what may have been perceived as a descent, the airplane settled down quickly and if the PF had done nothing but maintained pitch and power while calling for ECAM Actions while ensuring stable flight, (and 10 to 12deg pitch is
NOT stable flight at cruise altitudes!), we wouldnt' be discussing an accident here.