Y'all have been having some fun since I last visited.
Clandestino
gums
Good grief, Doze, how ya gonna get an overspeed warning if the air data system is FUBAR?
Good grief, Gums, where would the energy for overspeed come if you are at practical ceiling and pulling up like mad?
clandestino
gums
So maybe the junior crewmember up front was more worried about overspeed than stall or something else.
Maybe, but if he was, he was dead wrong and consequently just dead.
I'd rather be in a bar with you two, talking this over, a few pints included. T'would be goodness.
clandestino
AP was off and by the time descent started it was blocked off by ADR rejection due too to low forward airspeed. Capt was unable to grasp the situation so he thought it would be good idea to press the non-function AP button, without explaining it, either for the benefit of co-pilots or CVR.
Your analysis, not necessarily a fact. But I'll bet with your read on that one, if we have to go to Vegas on that.
gums
I read the CVR again, and the experienced pilot is telling the other guy to stop climbing and to be "gentle". After a minute of fruitless talk, he calls for the aircraft commander. All the while the stall warning doofer is going off.
This is CRM training module X: What does it take for the copilot to say "I have the controls," take the controls, and make the right thing happen? Over to the cockpit gradient sub discussion we go ...
Rockhound
Why was there not a proper handover to the captain when he returned to the cockpit?
slats:
Why did the Captain not get a useful handover when he returned to the cockpit? Had things already degenerated that much. He got garbled bits if information plus lots of warnings and alarms plus a feeling that things were not right ( abnormal pitch attitude). It would have been perplexing to understand what had gone wrong in the brief interval since he had left the cockpit.
The PF was task saturated. As I analyze the event, PNF had at least partially bailed out (mentally) when he called for adult supervision. (Aircraft Commander). The clue to this for me was the "where is he" and frequent call up.
That aside, the time and environment for "briefing" is when you are in control of the situation. The two up front were, from the evidence, NOT in control of the situation, but were playing catch up.
slats:
It would have been perplexing to understand what had gone wrong in the brief interval since he had left the cockpit.
Yep. Fatally perplexing.
Although we don't have the audio, it is likely that PF and PNF were somewhat agitated (or more) when the Captain returned. Lack of clear handover. And then confusion, lack of assertiveness, and likely increased agitation.
That's how I'd bet it in Vegas.
mm43
Nothing coherent (crew wise) happened in that cockpit from the A/P disconnect through to the end. It would seem that the BEA's Human Resources Group were not able to format a reasonable explanation for this behaviour either.
They were left guessing, but one wonder just what the "command climate" is at AF, and in AF cockpits. (Air France, not Air Force, about whom I have other doubts.
)
Clandestino:
Because CM2 got in his head that he has to keep the nose high, even if it meant setting TOGA and pulling all the way back. That's the only constant about his behaviour; he pulled when stall warning blared, he pulled when it did not. He pulled when F/Ds told him to pull, he pulled when they were knocked out.
He was quite successful in keeping the nose high, too.
Seemingly CM2 disbelieved everything he has seen or heard and somehow got idea pulling will get him out of the situation.
Training issue, and possibly an Airbus and Air France Indoctrination Issue. Education and training go hand in hand with indoctrination.
HN39 in re buffet: thanks, well explained!
The TAT has warmed from -42°C to -38.8°C over a very short time.
They must have just entered the warm rising air of a CB.
I almost hear Linda Ronstadt singing "Heat Wave" in the background.
Rockhound
No, Lyman, you could not make this stuff up.
Well said. Truth is once again stranger than fiction.