Originally Posted by Lyman
Clandestino has posited, in my opinion, that a shaker is not needed, simply because it is not fitted ...
Either we are looking at another dazzling display of inability to understand what was written or strong tendency to falsify other folk's posts. Shaker is not installed on aeroplanes that have natural pre-stall shake. BEA did flight tests with A330 with similar weight and C.G. as AF447. While they didn't push it all the way to stall...
Originally Posted by BEA
Airbus subsequently flew special flights to collect more accurate data at high angles
of attack and with an aircraft configuration close to that of the accident (mass, flight
level, Mach, etc.). These tests made it possible to refine the preliminary correlations
and to establish that the level of buffet was considered to be a deterrent by the test
pilots when the angle of attack was about 10°, corresponding to normal acceleration
amplitude of 1 g at the pilot’s seat. This angle of attack was reached at about 2 h 10
min 57 s during the accident flight.
Repeat after me: shakers are devices fitted to aeroplanes with natural pre-stall buffet too weak to comply with certifying regulations.
Originally Posted by rudderrudderrat
Why was something similar not thought to be necessary?
See previous entry.
Originally Posted by gums
Good grief, Doze, how ya gonna get an overspeed warning if the air data system is FUBAR?
Good grief, Gums, where would the energy for overspeed come if you are at practical ceiling and pulling up like mad?
Originally Posted by gums
So maybe the junior crewmember up front was more worried about overspeed than stall or something else.
Maybe, but if he was, he was dead wrong and consequently just dead.
Originally Posted by Lyman
Whether or not the a/p was engaged, apparently, the selector was ON.
It was not. Read the report, please. AP was off and by the time descent started it was blocked off by ADR rejection due too to low forward airspeed. Capt was unable to grasp the situation so he thought it would be good idea to press the non-function AP button, without explaining it, either for the benefit of co-pilots or CVR.
Originally Posted by Turbine D
very gentle adjustments of the sidestick are required?
Bravo sierra perpetuated on PPRuNe. Read the report. Page 87. Slamming the stick from full back to full forward in ALT won't kill or even hurt you, if the average of pitch gyrations is centered on cruise pitch.
Originally Posted by Turbine D
And finally, would the pilots who have or do regularly fly Airbus aircraft, such as Clandestino, be clamoring for sidestick shakers if it were of true benefit?
Who said I regularly fly Airbus? I was just a line jock, warming the RHS of 319/20 for a bit less than two years. Who gives a rat's stern about me? It is all in the certification standards!
Originally Posted by slats11
The timing seems suspicious, and I would not be inclined to dismiss an electrical fault just because this fault should not have produced ozone. It might have produced something that the pilots believed was ozone.
Every fault recorded on DFDR came from just two sources: 1) blockade of pitots in cruise 2) stall. No fault that could be consequence of shortcut or fire was detected. Of course, there is also a dissenting opinion on Egyptair 990 that claims there are faults that go completely unrecorded on FDRs yet render the aeroplane uncontrollable in seconds. We must examine every option, must we?
Originally Posted by slat11
Yes the explanation could be an updraft of warmer air associated with Cb.
That would leave massive trace on Nz. Read the report.