@Dozy
There is no doubt about that there had been nor a warning neither real overspeed. Sadly enough did this crew not realize what WAS their situation.
I found it remarkably though that BEA cared to mention it as a POSSIBLE reason for the otherwise very strange maintaining the SS in nose up.
Sorry to post again, but just as a reminder:
2.1.3.3.1 PF’s reactions
On the other hand,
in the absence of airspeed information known to be reliable, it is possible that the
PF thought that the aeroplane was in an overspeed situation, notably due to his
interpretations of several clues:
ˆ The aerodynamic noise,
ˆ The buffeting, that he might have interpreted as being due to high speed,
ˆ The speed trend arrow on the PFD, which at that time indicated acceleration.
He reformulated his impression
a*few seconds later, combined with an attempt to extend the speedbrakes.
Other factors which may have prompted the PF to fear an overspeed situation were:
ˆ The display on the ECAM (max speed 330/.82) combined with the reconfiguration
to alternate law which may have been read;
ˆ The fact that, in cruise, the upper red strip on the speed tape (MMO) is about ten
knots above the current speed, whereas VLS is barely visible at the bottom of the
tape (thirty knots less);
ˆ The dangers associated with overspeed situations embedded in the collective
consciousness of pilots.
May I add, that I did also exams for ATPL in France and I do recall that they were putting a lot of emphasis to the problem of overspeed in Aerodynamics. Much more than FAA or some other European ATP exams would. So I would understand a French pilot thinking of this getting into a subjectively high stress situation.