From what I've read I don't believe that Dozy was saying a Stick Shaker wouldn't benefit. Simply that you can't look at it from your armchair and say "that's the solution". You need to look at the whole system and work out the pros and cons. If I read the report correctly, in this tragic situation the pilot ignored the aural warning, ignored the instruments and even ignored the other pilot in the cockpit. He had become fixated completely and if he was ignoring all of those I would guess, and it is a guess, he had a mental picture where he no longer believed what the systems were telling him, if that is the case then there is a real possibility he would have ignored the stick shaker as a false indication too.
As for the crowded noisey room scenario, have you ever tried to break up a fight just by tapping someone on the shoulder?
I will also question why some people on this thread are obsessed with a stick shaker. This aircraft had a system that could have safely restored level flight had it been re-engaged. So, instead of putting a stick shaker in, why not allow the system to take control again if it is convinced that the aircraft is in danger of exiting the envelope?
The system is designed to respect principles that have been held sacred for several decades. The safety analysis is extremely stringent and forces decisions into the design that when analysed against a very specific set of conditions doesn't seem to make sense. If you step back and look at the whole picture, with all the analysis at your disposal, it makes more sense. Of course nothing is perfect, and it takes such events as this to expose weaknesses in the design decisions. However in these cases it is very rare for the fix to be simple. The system has to be re-analysed.
I have read a lot of comments on these threads, many seem to be from people who, from what they've written, appear to have never been involved in designing, clearing and certifying a complex avionic system. But even in their position of ignorance they are quite happy to throw rocks at the Airbus design team.
In my view of this tragic event, the aircraft let down the pilot by suddenly exposing him to a set of conditions that caused him to lose situational awareness and expecting him to run with it. The pilot let down the aircraft by not carrying out the basic tasks required to return the aircraft to safe steady flight. The reasons this happened are no doubt deep and wide going way beyond just the pilot and the aircraft, the lessons will be many and varied and hopefully will lead to changes that improve safety all round.
What scares me is for how little a span of time the airspeed was unreliable and how quickly this event went from routine to catastrophic. What saddens me is that perhaps in 99 time out of 100 this pilot would have correctly interpreted the situation and it would have become a none event.
