BOAC, re
post #284, "
What I am trying to establish is whether the UAS QRH action PROMULGATED BY AF at the time of 447 was as described."
If I may leap in on your question to
Dozy, the QRH drill and checklist did not reflect the EASA AD Procedure, which is:
PROCEDURE:
When autopilot and auto-thrust are automatically disconnected and flight controls have reverted to alternate law:
- Do not engage the AP and the A/THR, even if FD bars have reappeared
- Do not follow the FD orders
- ALL SPEED INDICATIONS...........................X-CHECK
If unreliable speed indication is suspected:
UNRELIABLE SPEED INDIC/ADR CHECK PROC...........APPLY
The QRH drill has essentially remained the same from
November 2002:
IMMEDIATE ACTIONS
- AP/FD........................................OFF
- A/THR........................................OFF
- FLAPS........................................MAINTAIN CURRENT CONFIG
- SPEEDBRAKES............................CHECK RETRACTED
- L/G............................................UP WHEN AIRBORNE
IMMEDIATE PITCH ATTITUDE AND THRUST GUIDANCE
If the failure occurs before thrust reduction:
- THRUST LEVER...........................TOGA
- PITCH ATTITUDE.........................12.5
°
If the failure occurs after thrust reduction:
- THRUST LEVER............................CLB
- PITCH ATTITUDE below FL 100.......10
°
- PITCH ATTITUDE above FL 100.......5
°
RESPECT THE STALL WARNING
WHEN FLIGHT PATH STABILIZED
- PROBE WINDOW HEAT...................ON
- ATTITUDE/THRUST........................ADJUST
The AD was to be incorporated into the applicable AFM 15 days after the effective date of the AD, (Jan 05, 2011).
Of interest is a note regarding the AOM, "the Aircraft Operating Manual is not intended to provide basic piloting skills, basic jet aircraft piloting techniques, or information that is considered as basic airmanship for trained flight crews familiar with that type of aircraft and with its general handling characteristics."
J.T., Re
post #303, "
Perhaps we should have a beer or ten to debate the pros and cons ?"
Re training vice checking, and jeopardy vice non-jeopardy, you should have seen the debates when we introduced LOFT!
The politics of failure and the underlying struggle for who controls who...regulator, airline, union, individual pilots - what a time.
Agree with all your comments on the sim. That said, I think there is reason to accept that "extrapolated" sim behaviour at and in the stall may not be that far from the airplane even though the regime is unflown, untested and has no data from such events. Because even a Level D isn't certified for here-be-dragons territory, it could only be used informally during any training. The primary difficulty has been the methods by which the AF447 circumstances are repeated, because the loss of pitots was not a separately-programmed scenario so the results had to be simulated using other methods and that can produce system behaviours that may not obtain in a loss of pitot(s) data.