John T: good points!
As seems to have happened pre AF447, and probably still happens, sim "training," or more importantly sim sessions with "x" on the line, may not be designed nor used to do a "training" function but instead confirm adherence to standard policies and practices, or to highlight subtle changes or revisions to same. "Gents, as you know, there is a new SOP on CAT III approaches. You've read the bulletin, let's see that you know how to put it into place during this sim session!" (And other tasks, of course ... )
There is value for any organization in doing that. There is solid argument to be made against conducting training on revenue flights, since the pax didn't sign up for other than "get me from point a to point b."
In the specific circumstances you cite, I am with you .. indeed, I would be in the line to participate for the reason you consider .. just where is my personal brick wall ? The underlying research value for training strategies is valid .. but the participants must be willing and not at jeopardy.
Respectfully, I contend that any Airline company that does NOT invest in its human capital -- pilots-- as I had previoulsy suggested, in which actual Training, refresher, and currency are deliberate and well defined aims of their precious and expensive simulator time, are wasting time that they pay for. Not seeing the forest for the trees, perhaps.
Perhaps we should have a beer or ten to debate the pros and cons ?
Indeed.
I suggest that it is in the self interest of any airline to keep its crews sharp, and deeply systems knowledgeable. The better you know your systems, inside and out, the better you can do your job and complete your mission.
Adopting that attitude reduces their (company) risks and increases their (company) success rates of "malfunction/emergency sorted" when things do go wrong.
I do not believe that I am the only person who holds that position.
Problem is, I don't run an airline and thus am in no position to make an impact. That a clear and careful implementation of this philosophy, as you describe it, has to go hand in hand with how to fund it presents any airline management -- or leadership if there is any -- with a critical problem to solve.
Well, that's why those folks in suits are paid.
I have a few
ed thoughts on what I think of MBA's who aren't pilots running airlines ... but that does not belong in this thread.
AF447 has to me shown that Air France (and perhaps a good portion of the industry?) does not make the points I allude to above a priority. (I may be overstating this, or may simply be wrong.) Maybe the idea I have would be that they have a system in place that doesn't achieve that end even if that were its intention.
Result: a crew unable to fly and CRM its way through a malfunction, with fatal results. From the CVR excerpts released, I get the impression of a crew that were trying and trying to get the situation under control, but they were trying
the wrong things to resolve their malfunction. (And one could argue that the "how" of their trying, as a crew, was not what we have come to expect).
An analogy to some of my own experience would be something like this: in a helicopter while flying above the high seas, experiencing a loss of tail rotor control during IMC conditions, but treating it as loss of tail rotor thrust or an AFCS malfunction. Could have ended in tears, were I and my H2P to respond to such a malfunction, as a crew, incorrectly.