AF 447 Thread No. 9

[Lyman]

Do not forget that for three years on, the topic has been discussed ad nauseum; in that focus is lost the emergent conditions 447 experienced 2:10:04.6 instant. Safe conduct of the flight is the underlying parameter of any pilot; they do not need to begin differentiating and splitting hairs
the instant Speeds are lost. That is the emergency, and I defy any one here to state they would be available instantly to gauge coldly if the flight became endangered with the unexpected loss of a/p.

Assume one of sadpole's aces were flying? Does he coolly hold steady, to assess, knowing the flight is not in jeopardy? He does nothing with the stick as the airplane bounces and descends, rolls? Or does he make inputs to correct? The airplane was left maneuvering at a/p drop, and the initial corrections applied were correct. So the correct action has placed the handling pilot in harm's way: He is handling, and the response is not being assessed correctly by the ASI, his one true ally has quit. His reactions to the first eleven seconds are in the record, and it is these inputs that set the stage for disaster. the accident was born in these first eleven seconds, the cart had been upset. There is no going back, the crew was committed, by virtue of the unexpected change in instrumentation. With PNF's remonstrations to "go back down", we see the possibility for salvation. The PF rejected this verbiage, his instruments had just revolted, does he trust the second in command? Or does he buy time by placating him, and continuing his incorrect path? We know the answer.

The materials used to date the manuals must be examined closely, some of the dates and alterations are in disagreement, and some were "updated" without notation. I would direct anyone's attention also to a photograph in the final report, showing "Arm 36G" in the Rudder. It is completely different from the one supplied by BEA initially, the one that began the discussion of the Arm attachment discrepancies in the image with the text of their analysis. Closely inspect this photograph, please.

Dozy, are you sure the Stick shaker/pusher has been abandoned in favor of FBW? 50's technology? The 330 cannot fly with the best Stall Warn available? The Warn that trumps even the speed/AoA aural that was dismissed/ignore by the crew?

And the finest Stall recovery tool, the Pusher? Are you saying that Airbus will improve the aural qualities of its SW, and that will be sufficient?

So again, would 447 have benefitted from the Shaker/Pusher? I say yes, and I would question your position that she would not have possibly even entered the Stall with this equipment?

I would admit that furnishing the Shaker to a side stick might be problematic, and the Pusher to an electronic controls system as well.