Taphappy,
Please excuse my jumping-in, but this is a close follow-on to my last Post, and things have gone quiet for a while....D.
Bharat-Rakshak records a very full and interesting: "Memories of No. 8 Squadron, IAF" by a S/Ldr T.J. Thomas IAF (Retd.). He was then a Cpl. (electrician) on the Squadron, and I cannot do better than quote from his memoir (submitted to B-S in 1981 by his son, W/Cdr. Joseph Thomas, IAF).
"The atmosphere in the Squadron was not all that good. There was intense anti-British feeling. The period was 1943-44. The turmoil in Indian politics kept this hatred alive. By this time a New Zealander (name I don't remember) took over command of the Squadron and we had as adjutant a Bengali Flying Officer. They were at loggerheads, we knew. Though no love was lost between the RAF and IAF elements, when it came to a question of keeping the aircraft flying, both elements put in their best"..........
(I would say that that is a very fair summary of things: I would not alter a word of it......D).
(Do not be confused by the name; "Thomas", though an English surname, almost certainly denotes a member of the Anglo-Indian community - just as there are many "deSousa's", "DaCosta's" and other Portugese names in Goa and the rest of India).
It was clear that at that time the IAF simply did not have the trained aircrew (and groundcrew) needed to form two separate Vengeance squadrons. They had been able to form one (7 Sqn), which
AFAIK, had no RAF component; but even that needed time to "work up", and they did not get into action with the Vengeance until moving to Uderbund (near Khumbirgram) until 28.3.44., being taken off operations to Ranchi at the beginning of June '44, on the onset of the Monsoon.
So they were in action for roughly two months only (they converted to Hurricanes in October '44), whereas 8 Sqn managed six months in the Arakan, (assuming that they would stop at the same time as 7, as it was a Command decision to end all Vengeance operations at the end of the season). (I am indebted to Bharat-Rakshak for the 7 Sqn dates).
I had some difficulty in "fixing" the date when 8 Sqdn pulled out of the Arakan to move back about 2,000 miles to Samungli (near Quetta, in Baluchistan, right on the Afghan border), but again B-R came to the rescue in a roundabout way. S/Ldr Thomas (whom we have just met) relates that an RAF crew crashed and were killed on arrival at the new base (Samungli). The B-R "Officers and Flight Crew" list shows a RAF pilot and wop/ag killed on 6.8.44. It is the only "double" casualty during the summer, so there's my date. Why didn't I know about that? For reason I can't now remember, I was on the rail party to Quetta, and that trip took sixteen days (not ten, as S/Ldr. Thomas recalls), so our chaps were dead and buried long before I got there. The names ? B-R has them, but I can't put faces to them now.
But we've only just got to Chaara, as I write. You must remember that our Flight there was composed of people from all the four RAF Sqdns; they weren't all our "old pals". Apart from Stew, my gunner, there was George Davies and Bud Yeates (and their gunners); there was no one else of our "old brigade". By now, almost all the old RAF SNCO aircrew had been commissioned. There were no SNCO Pilots on "B" (RAF) Flight of 8 Sqn, although there were still some Navs and Wop/Ags.
But we had been posted in to "get this show on the road"; the first job would be to compass-swing all the aircraft, and belt-up the ammo for their guns, before we could even think of moving forward. I imagine compass swinging is a thing of the past with today's sophisticated Heading Instruments, so I shall give an account of how it was.
An aircrew had to do the job (as only a qualified pilot is allowed to move an aircraft under its own power). The crewman armed himself with a "landing compass" - a hand held bearing compass - and the aircraft was taxied to a Compass Swinging Platform on a far corner of the airfield well away from stray magnetic influences.
There a large basic compass rose was marked out on a wide circle of tarmac. The pilot positioned his aircraft in the centre of this; his crewman hopped out with the compass and took up position to walk round ten paces behind the tail. The pilot worked the aircraft round the cardinal points one by one (he didn't need to be too precise). His mate walked round behind, and took bearings on the centre line of the aircraft each time his pilot stopped.
There are adjustment magnets built in under the cockpit compass. On each point therefore, the crewman climbed up to the cockpit and told his pilot the heading he'd just read. The pilot compared this with his (much less acccurate) compass, Out with a screwdriver, and the rule was: take out all the error on the cockpit compass on North and East, then half the remaining error on South and West. Then go round all the points again on a check swing, record the remaining error on each point on a little adjustment card which is dated and kept with the cockpit compass. Sounds simple.
But turning an aircraft on a point needs a lot of power and one-wheel braking. The crewman, choking in gales of hot dust, had to go back on each point and climb up to report the reading. With the best will in the world, the pilot couldn't keep the aircraft on centre for long, and would have to taxi in a circle to position his aircraft again.
The job was not popular, and so having to do someone else's backlog of work caused a lot of growling. But this paled into insignificance compared with the ammo. problem. You might suppose that machine-gun ammunition would come in belts ready for use. So it does, I suppose, for ground use when it is all one kind. But we had three "flavours" - ball, incendiary and tracer - and the "mix" was up to the user.
Our chosen sequence was ball-incendiary-ball-incendiary-tracer. This recipe had to be made up by hand - our hands - from single rounds. To complicate matters still further, we had two different calibres, .300 (US) rounds for the front guns and .303 (British) for the rear.
The stated reason for this was that the US .300 guns had been found so unreliable in service that they had to be replaced by UK .303s for our rear defence, where there was at least a possibility that they might have to be used. There was little chance of needing the front ones. Air combat in a VV was out of the question. Strafing was a possibility, I suppose, but the business of a dive bomber was to bomb and get away. The Hurricane and the Beaufighter were far better for ground attack work, in any case.
As to the reliability, it may not have been all the gun's fault. I suspect a lot of the .300 ammo would be WW1 stock; there would be a lot of duds in it; we could not cock the guns from the cockpit; so a dud round meant a stopped gun. In war films we've all seen cotton ammo belts jerking their way through the guns. There's no room for yards of empty belt in a wing gun bay.
Spring steel clips are the answer; when the guns are fired these go out with the spent cases. Each clip anchors one round to the next. You have to push the rounds into the clips by hand. It's a tight fit, the spring steel is sharp edged. Bloody fingers and thumbs were the order of the day (and we loaded 400 rounds per gun). Next you had to run the assembled belts through an aligning machine to ensure accuracy. One of our Indian (supposed) armourers put a .300 (fractionally longer than a .303) round into a .303 belt and forced it through the machine. (He bent the cartridge - luckily it didn't go off in his face!).
Curiously, a few months ago I saw on TV a clip of some RFC pilots in WW1. They sat in a companionable ring (like a sewing bee!), loading their Lewis drums with ammo. Nothing changes !
There was no ammo belted up, so all ranks had to turn to and get on with the job ("the gentlemen must draw (haul) with the mariners", said Drake). We were only there from 18th November '43 (although Bharat Rakshak shows us as on charge from the 26th) until we moved up to Double Moorings on 12th December. We went into action on the 17th and then followed an intense three months of operations until 24th February '44.
Then a forced landing after an engine failure put me "hors de combat" for a couple of months, and when I came back, all Vengeance units had stopped operating for the monsoon and would never start again. The game was up for them. They really operated for only one full ('43/'44) dry season, and had done a bit in '42/'43, but that was all they ever did in ACSEA (the RAAF did some work with them in New Guinea, but IK).
But for the moment we were still at Chaara. I think I only flew one (admin) flight to Ranchi and return. Don't know what for. The rest of the time we seem to have spent on compass swinging and the miserable belting up chore. That task was made all the more exasperating as we knew the .300 guns were practically useless (and in fact were never used), but it doesn't make any sense to go into action with your guns empty. Eventually we were as ready for action as we would ever be.
Bit of a mouthful this time - hope Mr Moderator will not object.
Goodnight, all,
Danny42C
Worse things happen at sea!